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vABSTRACT 
This thesis reviews disaster recovery situations in an effort to identify political 
and bureaucratic impediments affecting responders, defined here as the managers of the 
overall response effort.  The thesis focuses on improvements in organization, 
management and speed of response. It discusses local, state, and federal responsibilities 
in a crisis, as well as the limitations and constraints on disaster recovery efforts, with 
specific attention to the interaction of local, state, and federal responders. Analysis of 
response timing, promptness and adequacy is conducted through comparison and case 
study of three disasters in the United States in which local and state authorities were 
overwhelmed and required federal assistance. Cases presented are the Los Angeles riots 
of 1992 (the so-called "Rodney King riots"), the Northridge Earthquake in 1994, and 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  Response efforts are examined for a better understanding of 
problems that emerged in local, state, and federal cooperation.  The thesis pays particular 
attention to the federal responder and the U.S. Military.  Understanding legal, political, 
and bureaucratic impediments provides guidance on responders' limitations, constraints 
and opportunities and may facilitate efforts by federal responders to explore alternative 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii




C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................2 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS............................................................2 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................2 
1. Constitutional Authority .....................................................................3 
2. Control ..................................................................................................4 
3. Financing ..............................................................................................5 
4. Preparedness ........................................................................................6 
5. Strategy and Politics ............................................................................8 
6. Civilian-Military Relationship..........................................................11 
7. The Role of the Military ....................................................................14 
8. Response Leadership: Who is in Charge?.......................................14 
9. Supplemental Acts and Directives....................................................16 
II. LOS ANGELES RIOTS OF 1992 ............................................................................17 
A. HISTORY .......................................................................................................17 
B. LEADERSHIP AND TURF WARS.............................................................21 
C. INITIAL GUARD RESPONSE: INCORRECT TROOPS/ORDERS......24 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERALIZATION ............................................26 
E. POSSE COMITATUS ACT PROBLEMS ..................................................27 
F. CONFLICTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT..........................................29 
G. DIFFERENCES IN TERMINOLOGY AND TRAINING ........................30 
H. MISPERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS .............................................32 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................34 
III.  NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE OF 1994 ...........................................................35 
A. HISTORY .......................................................................................................35 
B. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE...........................................................................36 
C. COOPERATION ...........................................................................................39 
D. INNOVATION ...............................................................................................40 
E. BUREAUCRACY ..........................................................................................41 
E. MILITARY SUPPORT.................................................................................42 
F. CHALLENGES..............................................................................................43 
G. COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................43 
H. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................44 
IV. HURRICANE KATRINA.........................................................................................45 
A. HISTORY .......................................................................................................45 
B. RESPONSIBILITIES....................................................................................48 
C. DELAYED RESPONSE................................................................................49 
D. TRAINING AND EXERCISES....................................................................51 
E. POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY ............................................................53 
F. ASKING FOR HELP ....................................................................................56 
viii
G. COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................57 
H. ASSESSMENTS OF THE MILITARY.......................................................58 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................61 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................63 
A. POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP..................................................................63 
B. LOGISTICS....................................................................................................64 
C. TRAINING AND EDUCATION..................................................................66 
D. COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................67 
E. MISSION DECLARATION .........................................................................68 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................69 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Two Political Worlds of Disaster Relief Policy.................................................9 
Figure 2. Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.....................................................20 
Figure 3. 1992 Map of Los Angeles Police Districts ......................................................27 
Figure 4. Chronology of Events, Northridge Earthquake. ..............................................37 
Figure 5. Hurricane Katrina Developmental Timeline....................................................45 
































My participation in this program would not have been possible without the 
support and encouragement from the leadership at my previous duty location.  I 
especially would like to say thank you Brigadier General Danny K. Gardner and Colonel 
Dave C. Howe for their confidence and providing this opportunity.  I would like to thank 
my thesis advisor Professor Thomas C. Bruneau and thesis Second Reader Michael E. 
Freeman for their guidance, support, and patience throughout the thesis process.  I could 
not have asked for better advice and direction.  Additionally, I would like to acknowledge 
and thank my parents Paul and Carolyn Benivegna two of the most courageous people I 
have ever known, without which I would not be here today.  Finally, there is no one more 
important than my beautiful wife Tina Benivegna…thank you for saying “I do.”  Your 
love and support made it possible for me during this challenge and the words “Thank-






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to review disaster recovery situations in an effort to 
identify political and bureaucratic impediments affecting responders, defined here as the 
managers of the overall response effort.  The thesis focuses on the organization, 
management, and speed of response. It discusses local, state, and federal responsibilities 
in a crisis, as well as the limitations and constraints on disaster recovery efforts, with 
specific attention to the interaction of local, state, and federal responders. Analysis of 
response timing, promptness and adequacy is conducted through comparison of three 
disasters in the United States. 
The overall research question is: What political and bureaucratic impediments 
affect the effectiveness and timeliness of response to natural or man-made disasters?  
This question focuses on civilian-military relations and details regarding local and state 
officials interacting with the federal government.  In answering this question, a variety of 
related questions are explored, including:  Can disaster recovery be improved in 
organization, management, and response time?  What can be done to improve responder 
success?  In particular, what are the barriers to the integration of local, state, and federal 
responders, and how can these barriers be overcome?  What support should the federal 
government provide and when?  What are local and state responsibilities and federal 
limitations or constraints?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis identifies areas for improvement in disaster response and limits on 
efficiency resulting from politics and bureaucratic impediments.  The thesis pays 
particular attention to federal responders. Understanding legal, political, and bureaucratic 
impediments provides guidance on responders' opportunities and may facilitate efforts by 
federal responders to explore alternative methods for supporting local and state 
authorities.  Lastly, responders on all levels will better understand the hurdles of 
combined local, state, and federal disaster recovery efforts and may accommodate these 
constraints to serve those in need of recovery support. 
2C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The methodology of this research is the case study method of three disasters in 
which local and state authorities were overwhelmed and required federal assistance.  The 
cases analyzed are the Los Angeles riots of 1992 (the so-called "Rodney King riots"), the 
Northridge Earthquake in 1994, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  Response efforts are 
examined for a better understanding of problems that emerged in local, state, and federal 
cooperation. 
Numerous scholarly works in disaster recovery and response discuss local, state, 
and federal efforts and the regulations that govern these efforts will be used throughout 
this thesis.  In addition, many after action reports have been produced in the wake of 
disaster. Congressional testimony and reports are used to supplement these primary 
source documents.  Use of secondary sources is kept to a minimum as there are ample 
primary source documents and lessons learned repositories. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I includes a review of the relevant 
literature. Chapters II, III and IV present the case studies of the Los Angeles riots, the 
Northridge Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina.  Each of these chapters begins with a brief 
summary of the events leading to the disasters and the response efforts by local, state and 
federal authorities, followed by a presentation of the circumstances encountered by 
responders that highlights problems during the disaster response.  The final chapter 
presents conclusions and recommendations based on analysis of the case studies. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The 1992 Los Angeles riots, the Northridge earthquake, and Hurricane Katrina 
and all saw escalated response requirements, from the local through the state to the 
federal level.  Escalation started with local governmental response.  When the local 
authorities became overwhelmed with response requirements, state authorities 
implemented response actions to assist in the reduction of property destruction and to 
preserve life.  State authorities were then overwhelmed with response efforts and required 
federal support.   
3Much debate exists regarding the effectiveness and timeliness of federal support 
to these disasters.  The debate focuses on the civilian (or local and state officials) and the 
federal government (which can include FEMA, or the military) relationships and the 
extent to which integration of responders was successful.  Some contend that the federal 
government does not do enough to prepare for and mitigate disasters.  Others contend 
that local and state authorities are to blame for inadequate disaster response. This analysis 
of three disasters requiring federal support focuses on the impediments of the civilian-
military relationships and underlying political and bureaucratic influences. 
1. Constitutional Authority 
The constitutional structure, particularly the tenth amendment which provides 
“the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” generally limits or 
prohibits the federal government from asserting a centralized role in coordinating and 
directing disaster response.1  Problems arise because of non-subordinate hierarchies of 
authority within the states and federal government.  States retain autonomy from the 
Constitution, such as the power to enforce state laws using the National Guard if 
necessary, or to act as first responders, on-scene incident, or disaster recovery 
commander (authority seeded in the Constitution Amendments, Article II of the Bill of 
Rights).  State autonomy, as a “durable feature of our governmental system,” eliminates 
the ability of federal responders such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) or the Department of Defense (DoD) to step into a command or directional 
role.2  Only the President, as Commander in Chief, can authorize or direct the 
employment of active duty military in a domestic situation, based on authority provided 
in the fourth amendment and the Insurrection Act.3  The act provides the President the 
authority to deploy military troops within the United States to eliminate lawlessness,  
 
                                                 
1 Herman B. Leonard. “Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Responding to Future Katrina-Class 
Disturbances in the United States.” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee. Harvard University. 8 March 2006. 5. 
2 Leonard. 5. 
3 Jeffrey D. Brake. “Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background 
and Issues for Congress.” CRS Report for Congress. RL30938. 27 January 2003. 16. 
4rebellions, or insurrections, yet limits the President’s overall authority based on the 
assumption states and local authorities will remain the first responders regarding 
lawlessness within the U.S. 
2. Control 
An option regarding control involves Congressional control over the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS).  A cabinet-level department permits Congressional 
oversight on budgetary, personnel and mission issues.  The President retains some control 
with the ability to recommend nominees for the Homeland Security Secretary to 
Congress.  However, in recent years, it has been argued that FEMA has problems simply 
because it has completely focused on terrorist concerns and is led by inexperienced 
political appointees and staffed with inexperienced civil servants.4   
Congressional power over the departments potentially provides funding 
constraints.  Will Congress provide the departments enough money to carry out their 
missions?  Amid budgetary constraints, members of Congress have stated the Secretary 
of Homeland Security could reduce funding to other areas within his department, such as 
FEMA, and focus more on preventing or responding to a terrorist attack.5  Congress is 
quick to point out departmental inefficiencies and problems but does not point out who 
controls the purse strings.  Budget planning and guidelines initiate with the President; 
Congress and the President conduct negotiations, and ultimately Congress approves a 
budget.  Congressional oversight committees have direct access to departmental 
operations and should be held just as accountable as the departments.  Finally, arguments 
have been made stating funds distributed in support of disaster preparedness have been 
partially distributed based on political preference rather than need, requirements, or 
potential for disaster.6 
 
 
                                                 
4 Charles Perrow. “The Disaster After 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the 
Intelligence Reorganization.” Homeland Security Affairs. Vol II, No. 1. April 2006. 16. 
5 Perrow. 15. 
6 Perrow. 18. 
53. Financing 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs the Secretary of DHS to ensure that 
local, state and federal responders are prepared to respond to all disasters.7  However, in a 
disaster that overwhelms local and state responders and required military assistance, there 
is no provision to fund the military to ensure preparedness to respond.  Funds are 
allocated to the military to prepare for the defense of the nation. 
Elected officials assert that providing financial resources to responders will fix 
perceived problems.  This assertion is founded in public perception that progress must be 
underway if funds are allocated and spent.  However, opponents to unregulated spending 
argue that building effective response capabilities takes time and serious effort which is 
not remedied by simply spending money.  “National emergency response is a strategic 
problem, and thought should always precede action…spending money without an 
overarching system architecture or comprehensive acquisition program will be both 
wasteful and counterproductive.”8 
The allocation of federal funding supplied to state and local officials plays a 
significant role in that state’s or local community’s preparedness.  Additionally, the 
perception of preparedness and adequacy of funding provided may not always coincide 
with actual steps taken toward improvement.  In a survey of 183 cities from 38 states, 
only 20 percent said they had received sufficient federal resources to achieve 
communications interoperability, a vital resource for effective and efficient disaster 
recoveries.9 
Elected officials may influence the allocation of funds.  Congressional oversight 
committees oversee FEMA allocations. There is the potential for states represented on 
these committees to receive a disproportionate amount of disaster relief funding.10  
                                                 
7 Ben Canada. “Department of Homeland Security: State and Local Preparedness Issues.”  CRS Report 
for Congress. RL31490. 11 December 2002. 7. 
8 James Jay Carafano. “Preparing Responders to Respond: The Challenges to Emergency Preparedness 
in the 21st Century.”  Heritage Lectures; The Heritage Foundation No. 812. 20 November 2003. 7. 
9 Michael A. Guido. “Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post Katrina: The State of America’s 
Readiness.” The US Conference of Mayors Homeland Security Monitoring Canter. 26 July 2006. 1. 
10 Thomas A Garrett and Russell S. Sobel. “The political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments.” The 
Federal Bank of St. Louis. Working Paper 2002-012B. http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp2002/2002-012.pdf. 
Last accessed 20 February 2007. 5. 
6Thomas Garrett’s report “The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments” argues 
states with legislators on a Stafford Act oversight subcommittee received an additional 
$26 million in FEMA disaster relief expenditures for each legislator on a subcommittee.11  
It is important to note the DHS Secretary is responsible for administration and oversight 
of grant programs for state and local first responders.12  However, during a disaster, 
political influence may impact disaster response with the initial question of whether there 
will be a declaration of disaster, and with the question of how much money will be 
allocated.13 
4. Preparedness  
Keith Bea’s “FEMA Reorganization Legislation in the 109th Congress” report to 
Congress identifies problems with coordination of emergency response.  Among the oft-
cited problems:  federal agencies, including DHS, are unfamiliar with their roles and 
responsibilities under the National Response Plan; the DoD and DHS coordination is not 
effective; DoD and FEMA difficulties with coordinating slows response; Northern 
Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate 
interface with governors; and uncertainty about mission assignments and government 
red-tape delay medical care.14  Leadership failures, lack of initiative, coordination 
problems and existing integration failures have significantly reduced efforts to provide 
essential assistance.  Vagueness and broad summarizations in these reports permit 
interpretation regarding who or what is at fault.  As a result, recommendations in these 
reports provide little substance for improvement.  Some of these statements and 
recommendations include: “Coordination should be improved … Increased levels of 
commitment to and by state and local governments are necessary.”15  While highlighting 
inadequacies, this provides lawmakers or emergency managers no concrete guidance to  
 
                                                 
11 Garrett. 20. 
12 Canada. 1. 
13 Garrett. 2. 
14 Keith Bea. “FEMA Reorganization Legislation in the 109th Congress.” CRS Report for Congress 
12 July 2006. 3. 
15 Bea. “FEMA.” 6. 
7facilitate future improvements in procedure or allocation of funds. On the other hand, 
identification of problems is a start and allows lawmakers and responders alike to 
determine the best methodology for employment and improvement.   
Issues addressed by the 110th Congress follow the same footprint placed by the 
109th Congress:  Legislation has been introduced to improve emergency communications 
interoperability, improve intelligence gathering, and even to reestablish FEMA as an 
independent organization.  Additionally, the Post Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act includes improvements in the National Preparedness System and 
improvements to FEMA.16 
In a crisis, public officials and their constituents often question why the 
government cannot help people in trouble while charities and nongovernmental agencies, 
even movie stars, can get financial aid and other supplies where they are needed.17  
Combine this sentiment with global, real-time 24 hour-a-day press coverage, and the 
finger pointing begins regarding competency.  Politicians, usually not trained in disaster 
response, take time to congratulate each other on a response effort while suffering 
continues.18  An example of this is President Bush’s thanking of then FEMA director 
Michael D. Brown: “Again, I want to thank you all for -- and, Brownie, you're doing a 
heck of a job.  The FEMA Director is working 24…they're working 24 hours a day.”19  
David McEntire highlights the problem, noting that  
The anger and disappointment that may Americans felt about the 
response to Hurricane Katrina encouraged politicians to place blame.  
Local and state politicians argued that the federal government did not 
respond quickly enough.  National politicians asserted that the state and 
local governments were not prepared to deal with such an obvious risk.20 
                                                 
16 “Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and Other 
Organizational Changes.” http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1169243598416.shtm. Last accessed 28 
November 2007. 
17 Shawn Adams. “Learning the Lessons of Katrina for the Unexpected Tomorrow.” Risk 
Management. Volume 53. No. 12. December 2005. 24. 
18 Adams. 24. 
19 President Arrives in Alabama, Briefed on Hurricane Katrina. White House News Release. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050902-2.html. Last accessed 9 November 2007. 
20 David A. McEntire. Disaster Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics for Resilience. 
Hoboken NJ: Wiley, 2007. 283. 
8During disasters, some elected officials point to inadequate government response 
as a primary factor leaving thousands stranded or in need.21  However, it should be 
pointed out these same elected officials do not provide a definition of “The Government,” 
which should include their elected positions.  Spennemann contends:  
The effects of natural disasters transcend the boundaries of responsibilities 
of any federal government agency.  Too often in the past, the various 
agencies were in disagreement on how to proceed and the resulting tension 
often lingered well after the disaster and its aftermath have been 
overcome.  Clearly cooperation is needed.22 
5. Strategy and Politics 
Richard Falkenrath states that successful integration of local, state, and federal 
responders requires a comprehensive national strategy linking national policy with the 
numerous agencies involved in domestic consequence management.23  As Falkenrath 
writes, “The single most important reason why incident management is important is that 
lives hang in the balance.  Effective management is also critical to maintaining the 
public’s confidence in the government during crisis or times of stress.”24  However, 
institutions by nature are slow and reluctant to change.  Add the fact the U.S. has 
historically prepared for future events by benchmarking events of the past, and one 
wonders how any positive change is made to disaster response at all.  
Former FEMA Director James Lee Witt says, “Disasters are very political 
events.”  A federal disaster declaration can be affected by political influences.  The 
process involves the governor of a state contacting the President to request the 
declaration of a disaster.  States with political significance (electoral vote-rich states) 
have the potential to receive declarations easier than less politically significant states with 
greater actual needs.25  Furthermore, state governors are the link between the President  
 
                                                 
21 Adams. 25. 
22 Dirk H. R. Spennemann. and David W. Look, “Managing Disasters and Managing Disaster 
Responses: An Introduction.” Disaster  Management Programs for Historic Sites. 1998. 2. 
23 Brake. “Terrorism.” 19. 
24 Richard Falkenrath. “Homeland Security and Consequence Management.”  The Challenge of 
Proliferation. The Brookings Institution. 131. 
25 Garrett. 8. 
9and the state’s constituency, so personal relationships or political affiliations may affect 
the declaration of disasters, especially during election years.  Opponents of this concern 
say the sheer magnitude of a disaster keeps the potential for political influence in check.26 
Timing affects attention paid to disasters, particularly by politicians.  During and 
immediately following a disaster, considerable attention is devoted to the situation.  
Between disasters attention is naturally focused elsewhere.  Figure 1, from Peter May's 
Recovering from Catastrophes, summarizes how timing and attention vary. 
Two Political Worlds of Disaster Relief Policy 
Distinguishing Features Aftermath of Catastrophes Between Catastrophes 
Political locus Center stage Periphery 
Salience of relief 
issues High Low 
Legislative roles and 
influence 
Special legislation 
commonly introduced for 
large disasters 
More general legislation shaped by 
congressional "disaster specialists" 
Federal disaster 
agency role and 
influence 
Actions in aftermath of 
disasters define content of 
policy 
Promulgate administrative regulations in 




Central aspects of relief 
effort involving episodic 
ties to state and local 
politicians 
Relegated to ongoing ties between 
disaster agencies at various levels of 
government 
Resultant policies 
Responsive to disaster at 
hand and thus skewed 
toward catastrophic 
events 
More generalized policy that is less 
affected by catastrophic disasters 
Figure 1.   Two Political Worlds of Disaster Relief Policy.27 
 
State governors often develop interstate agreements of support prior to and during 
disasters, but may become bogged down with the bureaucracy of interstate politics and 
fail to act promptly to invoke this much-needed assistance.28  During disaster response,  
 
 
                                                 
26 Garrett. 10. 
27 Peter J. May. Recovering from Catastrophes. Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics. 
Greenwood Press Westport, Connecticut. 2002. 8. 
28 Adams. 26. 
10
issues as important as life safety sometimes give way to more divisive political issues, 
such where to house the displaced, or which areas should be first to receive aid.  Disasters 
are “intensely political, and ... the political issues soon dwarf the technical issues.”29 
The military is frequently ready to respond before receiving a warning order to 
deploy.  However, proactive response can be delayed or even not permitted by political 
red tape.  Military leaders offer military assets and receive a noncommittal response, or a 
response that highlights political boundaries of control that do not permit agencies on the 
ground to authorize support.30   
Political responses to a disaster frequently portray what is happening and help 
people understand what is required to sustain a response by properly using media outlets 
to provide vital information to local inhabitants.  Yet there are instances where elected 
officials focus on what should be done rather than what is being done as a matter making 
political statements of criticism.  Like unity of effort in disaster recovery, political unity 
is an extremely important factor in a disaster response.31  Individuals affected by a 
disaster need comforting and reassurance that everything is being done to help the 
disaster stricken area; criticism of actions underway, or statements pointing out 
inadequacies during a response do not provide this comfort. 
Congress has responded to debate over how it should balance state sovereignty 
with authorization of prompt federal response with several recent proposals. The Senate, 
as a result of 22 hearings between 14 September 2005 and 21 April 2006, proposed the 
creation of a new comprehensive emergency management organization, subordinate to 
DHS, to prepare for and respond to all disasters or catastrophes, establish regional strike 
teams and enhance regional operations to provide better coordination between federal and 
state agencies. 32  The House of Representatives proposed an addition to the Stafford Act 
to establish an emergency preparedness system to improve federal and non-federal 
capabilities.33  The proposal was never passed, however and has been revisited by the 
                                                 
29 Leonard. 10. 
30 Adams. 27. 
31 Leonard. 9. 
32 Bea. “FEMA.” 5. 
33 Bea. “FEMA.” 10. 
11
110th Congress for possible modification and reintroduction.  To date, only the U.S. 
Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007 have been passed which affords an additional $6 billion for 
hurricane relief.34 
6. Civilian-Military Relationship  
Civilian control of the U.S. military was founded on four fundamentals: The rule 
of law, the small size of American original regular forces (today’s federal military), the 
reliance on citizen soldiers, and internalized military subordination to civil authority by 
the armed forces.35  Civilian control means the decisions controlling the military are 
made by officials elected or outside the professional armed forces.  However, one might 
argue there is mutual distrust between the civilians who control the military and the 
military that supports civilians in control. 
Civilian leaders can organize the military in any manner they choose.  Military 
and civilian leaders frequently disagree on the organization of the military, exemplified in 
disagreements about organizing against a threat of foreign origin.  The military has the 
potential to evade civilian authority in several ways: by stating alternatives in a manner 
favorable to the military, by providing piecemeal advice that predicts nasty consequences 
if certain recommendations are not followed, or by leaking information to the press to 
persuade the public and politicians.36  As Kohn notes, “Bureaucratic maneuvering, and 
alliances with partisans in Congress and…the military, have become a way of life, in 
which services and groups employ their knowledge, contacts, and positions to promote 
personal or institutional agendas.”37 
The relationship between the military and civilian leaders is complex.  An 
important element in democratic civil-military relations is the perception of defense 
efficiency; where efficiency is based on the accomplishments of civilian-set goals for the 
                                                 
34 “U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations 
Act, 2007.” http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2206. Last accessed 28 November 2007. 
35 Richard H. Kohn. “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today.” 
Naval War College Review, Vol. LV, No. 3. Summer 2002. 11. 
36 Kohn. “The Erosion.” 6. 
37 Kohn. “The Erosion.” 7. 
12
military.  To determine efficiency of operations, civilian and military leaders must agree 
on the military “roles and missions.”38  While the military is an excellent resource to 
support disaster response and recovery, civil authorities should not count on a military 
response because of the military's numerous other mission requirements. 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provides 
the President the authority to declare major disasters and authorize federal agencies to 
provide assistance to local or state authorities that have become overwhelmed by 
disasters.39  The President, usually at the request of the overwhelmed state governor, can 
direct the DoD to carry out emergency work essential to preserve life or property for ten 
days. There is no explicit authorization for long-term recovery assistance. There is 
controversy over the act with regards to the pre-declaration activities, which appear to 
pre-empt some of the President’s authority.  The Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security may "pre-declare," placing responders on alert in a situation that may 
threaten human health and safety prior to declaration of disaster.40  However, this 
decision may be delayed, or impeded when the Secretary considers funding requirements 
in the event a response is not required, and the consequences of what is deemed 
unnecessary pre-mobilization.   There are no provisions for the Secretary to mobilize the 
military as a pre-emptive declaration.   
The Stafford Act is vague to provide flexibility in response, with no hierarchical 
criteria to facilitate the declaration or pre-declaration of a disaster. Controversy exists 
about the quality or quantity of information provided to the President prior to declaration 
decisions and the timeliness of anticipation of pre-declaration activities. 41  Disaster 
declaration is the responsibility of the President, and there is no concrete set of criteria 
that directs the President in this declaration.  Since there is no congressional oversight of 
disaster declarations, politics might influence the process.42  The Act was written to be 
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vague, and provides little accountability.  Simply put, if the President is the single 
authority that can declare disasters, then a disaster occurs whenever the President says it 
has.43  
The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. Section 1385) prohibits military involvement 
in domestic activities including arrests, law enforcement, and search and seizures of 
evidence unless specifically authorized under the Constitution or an act of Congress. 44  
The Act does not completely rule out military support.  When requested, the military can 
provide “passive” logistical support, technical advice, facilities, training, and other forms 
of support to law enforcement agencies, or otherwise, even if this assistance supports 
forms of domestic law enforcement. 45  However, the military remains in a support role in 
crisis response, even if the President invokes the Insurrection Statutes, which allow the 
President to deploy the U.S. military within the United States to maintain law and order, 
or prevent an insurrection or rebellion. 
There is considerable debate regarding the continuing effectiveness of the Posse 
Comitatus Act.  One point of view is the fact the Act should remain in place with no 
modifications.  The opposite point of view argues the Act should be revoked, or that 
severe modifications are required. The Act has not prohibited the military from providing 
indirect assistance such as logistical support or technical advice.  Additionally, the 
President has constitutional and statutory authority to maintain public order, including the 
authority to use federal troops to halt domestic unrest.  After receiving a proper request 
from a governor, the President may issue a proclamation that public order has broken 
down and the intractable individuals must disperse, and he may command the Secretary 
of Defense to restore public order.46  The application of the act has been misunderstood 
at times, and local police, state National Guard and federal active military forces have  
 
 
                                                 
43 Garrett. 4. 
44 Brake. 12. 
45 Brake. 12. 
46 Thomas R. Lujan. “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army.” Parameters. U.S. Army 
War College Quarterly. Autumn 1997. 5. 
14
been incorrectly or underutilized.  And there have been instances in which “neither the 
military commander, city police chief, nor the country sheriff had a clear perception of 
the proper role of military forces in an emergency.”47 
7. The Role of the Military 
“Where is the cavalry?” This question is often asked after a disaster, referring to 
the military and other public sector agencies.48  DoD Directive 3025.15 Military 
Assistance to Civil Authorities provides fundamental policy and guidelines for the 
military when supporting civilian authorities.  When DoD evaluates requests for 
assistance it considers the following criteria before providing assistance:  legitimacy (or 
legality), lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness.49  Military forces that 
respond to disasters are designed very differently from local, state, or other federal 
responders.50  Under this directive, the DoD may be requested to provide the FBI or other 
agencies with technical support, interdiction capabilities, law and order restoration or 
consequence management.51  However, it is important to note that the military assists 
civil authorities in a supportive role and is not the lead agency. 
8. Response Leadership: Who is in Charge? 
The development of the National Response Plan by members of the department of 
homeland security significantly improved overall planning efforts.  However, critics 
contend that potential exists for ambiguity regarding leadership during a disaster if the 
federal government responds.  According to the plan, incidents are handled at the lowest 
jurisdiction.  The plan outlines procedures for unity of command, but not assumption or 
declaration of command, leaving officials wondering who is in charge.52 Additionally, 
elected officials at all levels may feel the need to become involved.  This need for 
involvement primarily stems from a genuine concern to life and property in the affected 
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area.  Yet this same involvement often results in the provision of directions to responders 
by concerned elected officials who have little or no technical background, further 
complicating the question of who is in charge.53 
Lack of unified leadership and a single focal point often results in extreme 
inefficiencies in multiple agency notification, mobilization, information management and 
logistical support.  James Carafano further exemplifies this point: “Emergency response 
operations are also frequently plagued by a lack of information sharing and confusion 
over responsibilities among policy makers and emergency managers.”54  Furthermore, 
political statements have been made that local or state authorities should be and remain in 
charge because of their greater knowledge of local conditions, priorities, circumstances, 
rules and laws.55  While there is validity to local knowledge, these statements made no 
reference to qualifications of local leaders.  Disaster responses are an opportunity for 
finger pointing within all levels of elected officials, disaster responders, and the press.  
However, this finger pointing can usually be traced back to a lack of preparation: “Past 
research on the emergency response period has demonstrated time and time again that the 
major problems between governmental jurisdictions during this period result from a lack 
of coordination and communication, often resulting from a lack of prior planning.”56 
Unity in coordinating interagency efforts of planning and disaster response is 
extremely difficult.  One author contends this interagency coordination does not occur at 
all, stating, “It has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental 
planning for two reasons: other agencies of the U.S. government do not understand 
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problems.”57  Whereas the military may look to procedural or technological solutions, 
civilians may be more inclined to adopt ideas drawn from successful corporations or 
conclusions of management studies.58 
9. Supplemental Acts and Directives 
Three additional acts and directives are relevant to the topics discussed in this 
thesis:  The Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) of June 1995 provides the 
building blocks for domestic policy on terrorism. It is focused on threat reduction, 
deterrence and response.  The Directive divides the roles of the FBI into crisis 
management and FEMA into consequence management and also allows the DoD to 
maintain plans and equipment in the event a response is required. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishes the Department of Homeland 
Security by consolidating number of agencies, each with their own plans and hierarchy 
that had to be subordinated to the newly established DHS.  It has been noted that simply 
having a plan on the shelf does nothing unless the plan is tried through simulations, 
exercises, or implementation in a crisis.59  Realizing the potential for problems with 
numerous plans at various levels of government, DHS established the office for State and 
Local Government Coordination to coordinate among levels of government, assess and 
advocate for resources, disseminate information and technical support, and collaborate in 
developing response plans. 60   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 directed the Homeland 
Security Secretary to develop and administer a National Response Plan and National 
Incident Management System to ensure a comprehensive approach to disaster 
management at the local, state, tribal or national level and provides a flexible yet 
standardized incident management response. 61  
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II. LOS ANGELES RIOTS OF 1992  
A. HISTORY  
In the early 1990s, many Los Angeles neighborhoods experienced a severe 
economic depression.  Defense spending cuts, the actual and proposed closure of military 
instillations, and the departure of many manufacturing companies, as well as downturns 
in the auto industry, left the greater Los Angeles area troubled.  Racial tensions were 
made worse by increased immigration by Hispanics, many of whom were illegal, along 
with “white flight” to the suburbs. By 1990, Latinos comprised 49 percent of South 
Central Los Angeles, while blacks accounted for 43 percent.  Over 630,000 residents 
were living in poverty.62 
The economic downturn accompanied by an upturn in unemployment created 
opportunities for increased crime and gang activity.  The gang activity included the use 
and sale of drugs, especially crack cocaine.  Police Chief Daryl Gates instituted 
Operation Hammer in 1988 to combat the increasing crime and gang activity.  However, 
while increasing the number of arrests, the operation added to the racial tension.  Police 
officers, primarily white, were accused of harassment and racism because of their tactics 
of stopping, questioning, and searching individuals (usually black or Hispanic) simply for 
being on the streets.  The allegations of harassment culminated when over 80 police 
officers, following a bad tip in search of crack cocaine houses, raided four apartments and 
arrested 33 black men and women, destroying the apartments in the process. The city 
eventually paid over $3.7 million in civil damages for inappropriate use of force during 
the erroneous raid on the apartments.63 
Racial tension was fueled by a rift between Korean and black communities.  For 
years, Koreans had moved into Los Angeles, purchasing many liquor and convenience 
stores.  By 1991, Korean immigrants owned and operated over 3,300 convenience and 
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liquor stores in the greater Los Angeles area.64  Increased crime in the area made Korean 
shop owners wary of black patrons and more likely to view them as potential criminals, 
while the customers felt they were being treated with contempt, discriminated against and 
charged too much by shop owners.65 
Early in the morning on March 3, 1991, Los Angeles Police Department Officers, 
while detaining and arresting a man who seemed intoxicated or on drugs and non-
compliant, beat him for sixty eight seconds. These famous moments in history were 
caught on tape by George Holliday, and the broadcast of Rodney King’s beating was a 
national symbol of police brutality by the next day.66  King had led police officers on a 
high-speed vehicle chase for miles.  Over time, an LAPD helicopter, three LAPD cars 
and two Highway Patrol cars had joined the chase.  Two vehicle occupants with King 
were quick to comply with police orders and were taken into custody.  King was not 
compliant; he was blatantly defiant.  King was shot twice with a stun gun, threw officers 
off his back while they were trying to handcuff him, and charged at police officers until 
the use of police batons was authorized and directed.67  
Racial tension in the city was at a boiling point. Less than two weeks after the 
video of the Rodney King beating was released, a Korean shopkeeper shot and killed a 15 
year-old black girl named Latasha Harlins.  The shopkeeper claimed she thought she was 
being robbed and after a fight over a container of orange juice and shot Harlins in the 
back of the head as she left the store.  After a lengthy trial and review of the store 
videotapes, the judge sentenced the shopkeeper to a suspended ten year prison sentence 
with five years on probation.  The light sentence “convinced many in the city’s African 
American community that the U.S. legal system was unjust.”68 
Adding fuel to the racial tension, the trial judge decided to change the venue of 
the trial of the police officers charged with using excessive force against Rodney King, 
from downtown Los Angeles to the mostly white rural suburb of Simi Valley in Ventura 
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County.  Riots in Los Angeles began on April 29, 1992, after a jury of 10 white people, 
one Hispanic, one Filipino and no black representatives acquitted four LA police officers 
of using excessive force against King.69  From the time of the arrest and broadcast of the 
infamous 68-second tape until the acquittal, many in Los Angeles and throughout the 
nation believed that the four officers on trial were guilty and would receive a verdict as 
such.   
Some scholars contend that greed, alcohol, and longstanding racial tension, along 
with police incompetence, provided fuel for rioting and looting; the rioters were using the 
Rodney King verdict as an excuse for arson, looting, and killing. 70  As the riots 
progressed, gangs became more organized and heavily armed, presenting a serious 
challenge for law enforcement officials and the military. 
The riots of 1992 began approximately 4 miles from the Watts neighborhood 
where riots had occurred in 1965.  The verdict was announced at approximately 1515 
hours local and within 45 minutes an unruly crowd had formed at the intersection of 
Florence and Normandie.  Police arrived at 1630.  However, arriving ill-equipped, and 
seeing the large and unruly crowd, police retreated instead of attempting to arrest 
individuals who were throwing bricks and assaulting pedestrians.71  The Figure 2 shows a 
brief chronology of the 1992 riots. 
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Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots 
Date Time (24hr) Event 
29-Apr 15:15 
Acquittal verdicts announced in the trial of police officers accused of beating 
Rodney King 
29-Apr 18:50 
Rioters beat and nearly kill truck driver Reginald Denny as a television crew 
captures both the horror of the incident and the absence of Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) officers.  Hundreds of arson and looting incidents 
begin 
29-Apr 21:00 
The California governor's office informs the adjutant general that the governor 
has decided to mobilize (call to state active duty) 2000 California National 
Guard (CANG) troops at the request of the LA mayor 
30-Apr - 
A dusk-to-dawn curfew is imposed in large portions of the city of LA and the 
surrounding county 
30-Apr 4:00 Approximately 2000 CANG soldiers have reported to armories 
30-Apr 11:00 
Los Angeles County requests 2000 more CANG personnel; the governor 
approves the request 
30-Apr 13:50 
Ammunition from Camp Roberts (in central California) arrives in LA area via 
CH-47 helicopter 
30-Apr 14:35 
The first CANG elements (two military police companies) deploy in support of 
the LAPD and the LA Sheriff's Department (LASD) 
30-Apr 20:00 
About 1000 CANG troops are currently deployed "on the street," with more 
than 1000 more prepared to deploy and awaiting mission requests from law 
enforcement agencies 
30-Apr 23:56 LAPD and LASD request 2000 additional CANG troops, for a total of 6000 
1-May 1:00 
Perceiving the CANG deployment to be too slow, the governor requests 
federal troops 
1-May 5:15 The President agrees to deploy 4000 federal troops to LA 
1-May 6:30 
Approximately 1220 CANG soldiers are deployed in support of LAPD; 1600 
are deployed in support of LASD; and 2700 are in reserve awaiting missions. 
1-May 14:30 
Active component Marines from Camp Pendleton, California, begin arriving in 
the LA area via convoy 
1-May 16:30 
Major General Marvin L. Covault, Commander, Joint Task Force-Los 
Angeles (JTF-LA) arrives in LA area 
1-May 17:30 
Active component soldiers from Ft. Ord, California, begin to arrive in LA area 
via C-141 aircraft. 
1-May 18:00 The President announces that the CANG will be federalized 
2-May 4:00 Final plane with active component soldiers arrives 
2-May 11:00 
Approximately 6150 CANG troops are deployed on the street, with 1000 more 
in reserve; 1850 soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division are in staging areas; 
Marines prepare for deployment 
2-May 19:00 
First active component troops deploy on the street; a battalion of Marines 
replaces 600 CANG soldiers 
2-May 23:59 
More than 6900 CANG soldiers are deployed, with 2700 more in reserve.  
Approximately 600 Marines are deployed, but most active component Army 
and Marine Corps personnel remain in staging areas. 
9-May 12:00 
CANG reverts to state status, ending federalization; active component forces 
begin redeploying home 
13-27 May - 
CANG releases troops from state active duty, returning them to "part-time" 
status 
Figure 2.   Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots72 
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The riot’s severity was a result of police tactics combined with the number of 
people in the streets.  Arguments by Bert Useem provide two different hypotheses 
regarding the management of a potential riot and its outcome: 
1.  A swift police response at the intersection would have sent a signal to 
rioters that violence and looting would not be permitted.  A reverse 
bandwagon-effect would have occurred.  The riot would have imploded 
rather than exploded. 
2.  The wide-spread, intense anger stemming from the verdicts was 
destined to spill over into disorderly conduct regardless of police actions 
at the intersection.  If the Normandy incident had been quickly contained, 
another location would have been the boiling point for riots.73 
When the riots were over, 54 were killed and over 2,383 injured including 221 
critically, 13,212 rioters had been arrested, and there were 11,113 fires.  Estimates of 
total damages started at over $700 million.74 
Given the brief overview of the LA Riots, the remainder of this chapter presents a 
number of areas where response efforts could be improved focusing on problems such as 
leadership and turf wars, initial Guard response, restraint, consequences of federalization, 
the Posse Comitatus Act, conflicting rules of engagement, differences in terminology, 
and misperceptions of effectiveness. 
B. LEADERSHIP AND TURF WARS 
As noted in a Washington Times article, “Soldiers are trained to kill; policemen 
use force as a last resort…There is a deep-rooted American hostility to the idea of using 
the military for domestic law enforcement.”75 Once federalization took place, the L.A. 
Chief of Police and Sheriff worked to delay the deployment of the military into the city. 
Police Chief Daryl Gates says, “I recoil at the idea of a federally controlled regular Army  
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and Marine personnel, trained to fight a foreign enemy, being deployed on Los Angeles 
streets.”76  The Mayor’s office was forced to get assistance from the Governor to 
overcome the delays.   
Leadership at all levels was in disarray with one authority usurping another; those 
usurped did not always fall in line and support those above them.  There was much 
bickering among leaders which did not help the interface between the civilian sector and 
the California National guard (CANG), not to mention the interactions among the civilian 
sector, the newly-federalized CANG and the regular Army.  Who was in charge and 
where they were located were constant questions in the field.  Additionally,  
Politics and egos had a significant impact on various important decisions 
made during the riots…Sometimes senior officials merely wanted to 
appear fully in charge or posture themselves to take maximum advantage 
of the incredible numbers of media personnel in the area…At other times, 
decisions were made to help justify more questionable decisions made 
previously.77 
Many leadership conflicts resulted from perceptions of inadequacy and leaders 
jumping the gun there by not allowing lower level responders to do their jobs.  An 
example is when the Guard felt usurped by federal troops because the governor hadn’t 
consulted with them prior to requesting federal support.  As a result, the Guard resisted 
fully supporting federal leadership.   
There were problems on both the civilian and the military sides.  Los Angeles 
Mayor Tom Bradley and Police Chief Gates were openly at odds for many years. During 
the riots, the press reported a “vacancy of coordinated and forthright civilian leadership 
during the riots…[which] interfered with guidance from civil authorities to the 
military.”78   
There was apparent disinterest by civilian agencies for Guard support to the riot 
situation for two primary reasons: 1. the Guard members initially deploying to the riots, 
as previously mentioned, were inadequately trained and equipped; and 2.  police officials 
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felt their positions usurped.  Police officers in the greater Los Angeles area were assumed 
to be the foremost experts on the riots and civil unrest.  Additionally, the traditional role 
of the military is to support and not lead.  As such, “military forces are deployed only at 
the request of the appropriate civil authorities…if civil authorities do not think the 
military support necessary; the CANG had no leverage to cause them to incorporate 
military support into their emergency response plans.”79 
There were also problems with the plan for mutual aid among California law 
enforcement agencies.  As outlined in the mutual response plans, when one agency is 
overwhelmed by an incident, the state Office of Emergency Services should coordinate 
and dispatch reinforcements from surrounding areas.  Only after all agencies were 
depleted would the National Guard be called.  It was assumed, as the incident increased 
in severity, that the Guard would receive an appropriate warning notice and with time to 
mobilize.  However, the unanticipated rapid escalation of the civil disturbance 
overwhelmed the mutual support agency in a matter of hours, requiring immediate 
deployment of the National Guard.80   
Some analysts argue that the LAPD's eventual request for troop support was a 
wise precaution, while others contend that the police were merely trying to shift blame or 
cover their own inadequacies. Still others argue that, because civil authorities did not plan 
and coordinate emergency responses with other agencies, in particular the Guard Bureau, 
it was only a matter of time before the military was required to restore law and order.  
The lack of planning and coordination was partially to blame because, “It was 
inconceivable that the LAPD would ever require outside assistance….as late as midnight 
the first night of the riots, Chief Daryl Gates doubted the need to deploy the CANG, 
telling a television news reporter that he ‘didn’t want to be taking orders from a 
general.’”81  Indeed, lack of preparation, foresight and inability to understand one’s own 
capabilities played a significant role in the riots. 
After federalization of the National Guard, the on scene Joint Task Force – Los 
Angeles commander, Major General Marvin Covault, did not completely support all of                                                  
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the requirements necessitated by the riots.  His mission analysis resulted in the conclusion 
that military essential tasks did not include maintaining law and order, and that “It was 
not the military’s mission to solve Los Angeles’s crime problem, nor were we trained to 
do so.”82 
Contributing to relational stress and commander resentment was the 
understanding by the JTF-LA that the mission had basically been completed prior to the 
arrival of federal troops, so the primary focus of JTF-LA leadership was to expeditiously 
remove federal forces from the area.  Local officials, already dissatisfied with the JTF-
LA denial of law enforcement requests, were further frustrated when the federal troops 
began to pull out of the region without consideration of law enforcement priorities and 
needs.  Exclusion of LAPD and local law enforcement agencies from the exit strategy 
decision making process further stressed units in the field as they did not have adequate 
time to adjust to the removal of federal troops.83 
C. INITIAL GUARD RESPONSE: INCORRECT TROOPS/ORDERS 
As news of the riots began to spread, incidents on the ground began to rapidly 
increase, and it was only a matter of time before the riots became so large they 
overwhelmed local law enforcement officials.  If local law enforcement officials became 
overwhelmed, it was obvious that the National Guard would be mobilized to help 
establish order.  Yet the mission of the Guard was unclear, as the following summary 
explains: 
1.  CANG leadership did not have a deployment timeline establishing 
when troops would be available on the streets. 
2.  Law enforcement agencies expecting military support did not know 
when to expect troops to arrive. 
3.  Law enforcement agencies did not know where they wanted the troops 
to be deployed nor exactly what the soldiers should do once they 
appeared.84   
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Although they had planned for mutual aid with fellow law officials from 
neighboring counties, law enforcement leaders initially had not considered use of the 
military to help quell a civil disturbance.  As a result, when the crisis arose, military 
support arrangements were mostly ad hoc.85 
The California National Guard has troops trained and equipped to respond to civil 
disturbances. Instead of deploying the 49th Military Police Brigade located over 400 miles 
north of Los Angeles, the rapid growth of the civil disturbance required immediate 
deployment of troops from a mechanized infantry division stationed much closer to Los 
Angeles.86  Though closer, they were not equipped or trained for such a deployment, but 
the Mayor and Governor both felt a more rapid response (though not adequate in terms of 
training and equipment) was better than a delayed proper response (one which included 
troops with proper training and equipment).  The 40th Division deployed without riot 
gear, essential equipment for their M-16 rifles, or small arms ammunition.87 
Many California Army National Guard members came under fire or were taunted 
by armed gang members, but these "citizen soldiers" showed restraint.  Restraint in the 
use of deadly force, especially in the face of provocation, is a reflection of leadership, 
training and the professionalism of the noncommissioned officers.  “Fire discipline has 
long been recognized as a mark of the professional soldier, and the restraint and 
discipline shown by the Guardsmen during the riots was exemplary;” the deployment was 
extensive: 9,588 California National Guardsmen were deployed with over 325,000 
rounds of rifle ammunition, 36,000 rounds of pistol ammunition and 3,750 tear gas riot 
grenades.88  Battalion commander Lieutenant Commander Wenger asserts that all rounds 
fired (a total of 20 by Guardsmen) were all accounted for:  “In fact, this may have been 
the only civil disturbance in recent U.S. history in which all of the rounds fired by 
soldiers could be accounted for.”89  Analysts referencing this restraint by the Guardsmen 
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question the idea of federalization, and whether federal troops showed the same restraint, 
wondering if federalization was correct response to the control and management of the 
riots. 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERALIZATION 
Federalization occurred on the morning of May 1, but it was the next day before 
the California National Guard operations center received word and stopped receiving and 
approving missions and tasking Guard units without Task Force LA direction.  Adding to 
the confusion, federal troops began using freeways, easily found on maps, as easy 
boundary jurisdictional delineators for response locations.  This led to CANG brigade 
and battalion units changing from the established procedure of supporting one single 
police jurisdiction to supporting several police areas and operations bureaus, including 
operations in more than one city.90  Federal, state, and local actors continued to ask “Who 
is in charge?”  Indeed, even police officials who had previously coordinated with one 
military agency were supported by multiple units and required to coordinate with more 
than one military operations center.  The figure below illustrates the size and location of 
the riots and relevant various jurisdictions within the greater Los Angeles area.   
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Figure 3.   1992 Map of Los Angeles Police Districts91  
 
 
E. POSSE COMITATUS ACT PROBLEMS 
Interpretations of the Posse Comitatus act by commanders in the field can be 
confusing, as Major General James D. Delk of the California National Guard points out.  
“I frankly did not know until several months after the riots that the Posse Comitatus did 
not apply.  Did MG Covault make the same assumption I did, did he make a mistake (or 
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his JAGs), or was he given guidance?”92  The California National Guard, while under 
control of the governor (authorized under Title 32 U.S. Code) has the ability and 
authority to participate in enforcing domestic law and conduct police activities.  
However, federal troops (authorized under Title 10 U.S. Code) are prohibited from 
enforcing domestic law. A misinterpretation and incorrect application of the Posse 
Comitatus Act reduced the Guardsmen’s effectiveness in supporting law enforcement 
agencies by 80 percent once federalized.93  Prior to federalization, Guardsmen were able 
to respond to any and all requests provided by local law enforcement officials (with 
manpower as a limiting factor); after federalization, incorrect application of the Act 
prohibited Guardsmen from acting to enforce domestic laws and supporting the same 
requests from local law enforcement officials. 
Prior to federalization, the California National Guard had an expedited procedure 
to approve local law enforcement requests for support.  Guard leadership delegated 
maximum authority possible to regional and local subordinate military commanders to 
work directly with law enforcement officials.  Before federalization, the CANG 
supported almost all requests by law enforcement. Troop strength was the limiting factor, 
but there was no Posse Comitatus Act interpretation requirement under Title 32.94  
However, once federalized and placed under control of Joint Task Force Los Angeles, 
requests for CANG support to law enforcement agencies were subject to a test to 
determine if the law enforcement was applicable to military operations.  Regular military 
officers had misinterpreted the intentions and legality of the Posse Comitatus Act and 
were afraid of breaking the law regarding the use of federal troops to enforce domestic 
laws.  Officials failed to understand that if federal troops are deployed by a Presidential 
order to restore law and order, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply and becomes an 
unnecessary constraint in “a sudden and unexpected civil disturbance, disaster, or  
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calamity.”95  In fact, “the Presidential Order of 1 May provided JTF-LA the authority to 
‘restore law and order,’ which included the performance of law enforcement activities; 
Posse Comitatus therefore could not limit the military’s options in this circumstance.”96 
It [JTF-LA] required each request for assistance to be subjected to a 
nebulous test to determine whether the requested assignments constituted 
a law enforcement or a military function.  As a result, after the 
federalization on 1 May…not only were the federal troops rendered 
largely unavailable for most assignments requested by the LAPD, but the 
National Guard, under federal command, was made subject to the same 
restrictions, therefore had to refuse many post-federalization requests for 
help.97 
As the JTF-LA began to control situational responses, it established liaison teams 
at four previously established LAPD operations bureaus and at the City of Los Angeles 
emergency operations center.  These liaisons were responsible for coordinating support to 
the law enforcement agencies.  However, review requirements for each request required 
the signatures of the JTF-LA commander, operations officer, liaison officer, and staff 
judge advocate.  This process significantly slowed response approval, leaving aside that 
the definitions of whether law enforcement requests were legal was still vague.  Further, 
each approved request had to be revalidated daily, and new requests took an average of 
six to eight hours for approval.  Because of the revalidation process, many police officials 
and military units in the field did not perform support missions because they did not 
realize the missions were still approved.98 
F. CONFLICTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
California National Guardsmen were on the streets of Los Angeles for four days 
with armed weapons based upon the Arming Order (AO-5) issued by Major General 
James Delk.  After federalization, they were ordered under a new arming order (AO-1, 
issued by Joint Task Force Los Angeles Commander Major General Marvin Covault) to 
remove ammunition from weapons, put away all ammunition and “sling arms.”99  The 
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new arming order made several aspects of the counter riot mission unclear, confusing, 
and constraining to effective military operations.  Individuals previously armed under 
AO-5 were ordered to AO-1, with no change in the situation on the ground.  They did not 
understand what had changed to reduce their ability to enforce laws or use force if 
necessary.  The disarming placed soldiers at a perceived greater risk because gang 
members could determine if weapons were loaded simply by looking to see if weapons 
contained magazines.  Finally,  
Most soldiers on the street, and the police officers they were supporting, 
believed that merely being in uniform in LA…required a higher state of 
readiness than AO-1…despite repeated admonitions from the JTF 
headquarters, National Guard officers and senior NCOs left it to the troops 
on the ground to determine the appropriate arming order.100   
Here, conflicting rules of engagement, arming orders and direction from 
leadership posed problems for individuals in the field.  Questions were raised regarding 
the personal safety of the troops on the ground and their right to defend themselves.  
Partially responsible for the change in arming order was the fact that federalized troops 
are supposed to assume a supportive role to local law enforcement officials.  However, 
Guardsmen who were permitted to enforce domestic laws under Title 32 (referencing law 
or U.S. Code governing, among other things, a state’s ability to sustain a militia capable 
of enforcing domestic laws) were no longer able to carry out the same missions when 
federalized under Title 10 (U.S. Code governing permissible or required activities of the 
nation’s military) because of conflicting guidance from multiple leadership chains 
throughout the riot timeframe. 
G. DIFFERENCES IN TERMINOLOGY AND TRAINING  
Training and tactics vary considerably between the military and domestic police 
officers.  When the military is combined with domestic police units, differences in 
training may become problematic.  The following story illustrates a situation that resulted 
from differences in training and terminology between the military and civilian law 
enforcement agencies: 
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Police officers responded to a domestic dispute, accompanied by marines.  
They had just gone up to the door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were 
fired through the door, hitting the officers.  One yelled ‘cover me!’ to the 
marines, who then laid down a heavy base of fire…The police officer had 
not meant ‘shoot’ when he yelled ‘cover me’ to the marines.  The term 
‘cover me’ meant the same to him as it does to the Army (National Guard) 
soldiers.  That is, point your weapons and be prepared to respond if 
necessary.  However, the marines responded instantly in the precise way 
they had been trained, where ‘cover me’ means ‘provide me with cover 
using firepower.’101 
Lieutenant Colonel Wenger states, “Units at all levels need more training to 
prepare to meet future challenges such as those we [California Guard] faced in Los 
Angeles – specifically, the requirement to complement law enforcement.”102  According 
to CANG Field Commander Major General James Delk, conflicting arming orders, both 
prior to and after federalization, resulted from federal military leaders' desire to evade 
culpability and responsibility in case a troop shot a civilian.  Delk states, “This was a 
[federal military] leadership problem and illustrates the military’s failure to confront the 
compelling and contradictory issue of urban combat in a peacetime environment.”103   
At times the civilian leadership did not fully understand the capabilities of the 
military, due primarily to a lack of exercise and training at all levels of the leadership 
hierarchy.  As the riot progressed, civilian authorities at the County Emergency 
Operations Center assigned individual troops or small teams inconsistently with their 
training, equipment, or ability.  The review report produced for the governor, Assessment 
of the Performance of the California National Guard During the Civil Disturbances in 
Los Angeles (the "Harrison Report") says: 
This resulted in individual soldiers being committed to a very volatile 
situation performing duties for which they were not specifically trained, 
without benefit of their accustomed leadership…with inability to 
communicate with other soldiers or units…with live ammunition 
chambered in their rifles.104 
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Police or other civilians who may be integrated with the military must maintain a 
standard or basic level of knowledge with a particular understanding of the procedures 
for requesting military support.  This knowledge base must include both the capabilities 
and restrictions of the National Guard under state and federal control.105  
Military training and integration with civilian law enforcement under the constant 
press scrutiny is a challenge to military leaders.  In war, the actions of small units might 
significantly influence the outcome of the battle.  However, inappropriate actions by a 
small unit are unlikely to determine the outcome of the war.  In contrast, the mere 
misperception of misconduct, mistakes, or ineptitude by a handful of troops can negate 
the achievements of all the troops working to reestablish law and order.  Indeed, “because 
public perception plays such a large role in determining the outcome of a peacekeeping 
mission, small-unit actions in such missions appear to have a significant potential for 
large-scale effects.”106  In this area, effective training may alleviate many potential 
shortfalls by troops within the city and the news media reports on those shortfalls.   
H. MISPERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The California National Guard rapidly mobilized and began preparing for 
deployment into the riot stricken area once it was called upon.  However, the riot grew so 
fast that the leaders of the California National Guard could not convince the governor and 
mayor of Los Angeles that troop mobilization and deployments were on schedule. 
Because of a lack of integrated exercises, and with the misperception that the National 
Guard would provide an immediate response, the governor did not allow adequate time 
for mobilization and deployment and called for federal support.  One review of the 
decision to request federal support has led to the conclusion that the governor “in an 
apparent surrender to politics and images on national TV screens, agreed to ask for help 
from the federal government.”107 
Yet others contend that the governor did not make the decision to call for federal 
troops hastily.  In the early hours of the riots, Warren Christopher, while serving as 
                                                 
105 Wenger. Last accessed 26 April 2007. 
106 Schnaubelt. Last accessed 23 July 2007. 
107 Schnaubelt. Last accessed 23 July 2007. 
33
Chairman of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (later 
known as the Christopher Commission) advised Mayor Bradley to request federal troops 
and federalization of the California National Guard.  Christopher felt the riots were out of 
control. Furthermore, "The National Guard," according to Christopher, "was very slow to 
move in and that’s fairly typical too…the National Guard is not very effective in these 
situations.”108  However, it was not until 1400 on the second day of rioting that the 
National Guard received orders to deploy.  Essentially, the federalization of Guardsmen 
was a result of civilian leadership’s lack of confidence in the CANG, which was 
compounded by a lack of understanding of employment procedures, military-police 
coordination, and admitted confusion over logistics.109   
The state of California has an internal mutual aid agreement so that if one 
jurisdiction becomes overwhelmed, neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions can be 
called upon for support.  The Webster Report, a product of a five month review of the LA 
Riots by a panel led by former FBI Director William Webster, says that members of the 
state Office of Emergency Services were working to implement the mutual aid system, 
but could not get senior management support, to National Guard troops were requested 
by the Mayor and allocated by the Governor before the law enforcement mutual aid 
request was completed.110 
One other item—simply, a lack of involvement—may be related to the perception 
of ineffectiveness and willingness to jump the gun by elevating requests for support prior 
to completing lower level assessments and response action plans.  Before the riots, 
Governor Pete Wilson had not visited the Guard in the field, nor did he have a clear 
understanding of their capabilities, a problem exacerbated by the fact the Adjutant 
General had no direct access to the Governor’s office, a policy in many other states as 
well.  Misunderstanding the capabilities of the California Guard, Wilson, along with 
Mayor Bradley, requested federal assistance and federalization of the CANG without 
consulting the Guard’s leaders.111 
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I. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the events resulting from 
the Los Angeles Riots of 1992.  It provides an initial summary of the situation leading up 
to the riots and highlights some potential causes for the rapid escalation.  Additionally, 
the chapter provides information regarding impediments to effective disaster recovery 
when local, state, and federal responders are involved.  The following is a brief summary 
of items presented in this chapter.  Unified leadership at all levels of disaster response 
was a requirement not afforded during the riot response.  Unity of effort and streamlined 
chain of command could have prevented conflicting rules of engagement and duplication 
of effort.  Additionally, deploying correctly trained and equipped personnel from the 
National Guard had potential to swiftly restore law and order.  Next, federalization of 
Guardsmen was a difficult decision which should have required a careful assessment of 
the consequences of local and state authorities being overwhelmed requiring federal 
assistance.  The request for federalization may have been made too early.  Finally, correct 
application of the Posse Comitatus Act after federalization of the Guardsmen and 
deployment of U.S. military coupled with improved education and training of officials in 
leadership positions is imperative to a successful integrated disaster response.  The 
following chapter will provide a similar summary for the response to the Northridge 
Earthquake. 
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III.  NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE OF 1994 
A. HISTORY 
On January 17, 1994, at 4:30 a.m., an earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter 
scale struck California.  Centered approximately one mile south of Northridge, the quake 
was responsible for over 70 deaths and thousands of injuries.112  Over 110,000 residential 
and commercial structures were severely damaged and over 25,000 people were left 
homeless.  Regional transportation was hampered by damage to highways in the greater 
Los Angeles area.  Initial damage estimates began at $20 billion.113  The timing of the 
earthquake spared lives.  Had the quake occurred in midday or during rush hour, many 
more would have died.  But although lives were spared, by March 2, 1994, the date of 
Congressional hearings, over 230,000 people had applied for disaster assistance.114 
Larger scale earthquakes have become more frequent in California, and a 
spokesperson for the U.S. Geological Survey reports "a pronounced increase in the 
seismic energy release” since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. 115  Analysts claim that 
the increased frequency of earthquakes allowed disaster responders to learn from 
catastrophes and decisions of the past, improving response efforts when compared to 
other disasters.  They contend that the continual learning process provides the foundation 
for future response efforts.116  Yet the continual process of learning and improving 
requires continuity.  Complementing this informal learning process is the formal 
establishment of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program authorized by the 
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 and subsequent reauthorization and 
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amendments.117  The act was established to “provide information about both earthquake 
hazards and risk to concerned citizens, public officials, and planners in order to (1) 
minimize loss of life and property and (2) to minimize economic hardship and social 
disruption.”118 
B. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
Within one hour of the quake, the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services 
contacted the California National Guard headquarters, which activated its Crisis Action 
Center in Sacramento.  Within two hours, the 40th Infantry Division Emergency 
Operations Center was activated in Los Alamitos, and numerous Guard units were placed 
on alert.  Over 2,600 members of the California National Guard were activated with the 
assumption they would be needed to enforce basic law and order, ensure public safety, 
distribute essential items such as food and water, and provide housing.119  The following 
figure provides a basic timeline of the earthquake and response efforts: 
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Figure 4.   Chronology of Events, Northridge Earthquake.120 
 
 
James Lee Witt, then-Director of FEMA, says that a swift response prevented 
further damage and remedied and reduced suffering.  Within minutes, the federal 
response was forming and “President Clinton directed all federal agencies to devote their 
resources to response and recovery efforts.” Within an hour, FEMA’s Regional 
Operations Center was activated; it teamed with the Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services and other federal agencies to “mobilize emergency shelters for disaster victims, 
provide food, water and emergency supplies, dispatch emergency medical and urban 
search and rescue teams, clear debris from damaged roadways and bridges, and begin 
repairs to impacted bridges and highways.”  According to Witt, over 27 agencies 
cooperating together, along with the American Red Cross, met the federal disaster 
response benchmark set by Clinton for “collaboration, fiscal responsibility, flexibility, 
efficiency, compassion and speed.”121   
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According to Witt, the President's immediate disaster declaration allowed the 
federal government to quickly and efficiently mobilize resources.  Senior officials arrived 
in California and were able to offer immediate disaster funding to individuals.  Because 
of the disaster declaration, officials could adapt federal programs to meet unique needs of 
the earthquake victims and simplify disaster assistance applications to speed the 
process.122  Finally, FEMA had the ability and foresight to advance $305 million to the 
state and local governments, allowing for immediate local assistance for matters like as 
emergency shoring of damaged buildings and clearing of debris. 
As a result of the earthquake, critical arteries in the Los Angeles area were cut, 
damaged, and filled with debris.  However, contracts to remove debris and initiate repairs 
to roadways and bridges were in place before the end of the first day and workers began 
clearing debris and demolition by 7:00 p.m. the day of the earthquake.123  The governor, 
mayor of Los Angeles and federal highway administrator worked together to prioritize 
repairs, initiate contracts and provide incentives for early completion.  Federal responders 
cut through the red tape and partnered with state and local authorities to ensure the vital 
roadways were repaired in record time.124 
California Transportation (Caltrans) completed their assessment of damages to 
Los Angeles county transportation arteries early in the day; once President Clinton 
declared a disaster for the county, the Federal Highway Administration partnered with 
Caltrans and released emergency relief funds.  The release of funds was not based on a 
prioritized listing of requirements backed by complete detailed government estimates and 
negotiated contracts, but rather good faith agreements targeted at expeditiously and 
immediately rebuilding vital highway networks.125 
 
 
                                                 
122 Witt. 16. 
123 Brodesky. 9. 
124 Buck McKeon “The Government’s Response to the Northridge Earthquake.” Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology: Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight House of Representatives. 19 January 1996. 28 
125 Brodesky. 12. 
39
C. COOPERATION 
Throughout the disaster response and recovery, there were numerous instances of 
cooperation among local, state and federal officials, and officials in a variety of roles 
have noted the massive amount of cooperation among numerous agencies.  Federal 
agencies, including FEMA, responded very effectively, as did non-governmental 
organizations, as Congressman Julian Dixon from California noted: 
I would like to say that…FEMA performed in the last disaster [regarding 
Northridge earthquake] from my observation their performance was 
excellent…I have found that Director Witt had not only been on the scene, 
but very cooperative with the California delegation…I also recognize 
agencies of goodwill have differences…nevertheless, whether it is the city 
of Los Angeles, or the State of California or FEMA, our Federal 
representative, I think they responded in good faith, had a good degree of 
cooperation and think our task is to make sure that in the future that degree 
of cooperation and success continue.126 
Political ambitions were set aside and individuals came together to resolve one of the 
largest disasters to strike the United States.  Congressman Buck McKeon, speaking at a 
Senate subcommittee hearing, pointed out:   
I talked with Director Witt and I remember the room when we opened the 
first disaster center, Dick [mayor of Los Angeles] was there the Governor 
was there, and your [subcommittee Chairman] first words were ‘we need 
to stick together’ and we did that…we weren’t taking about Democrats or 
Republicans or liberals or conservatives or whatever…we were pulling 
together as Americans to try to help people get through a tough time.”127 
FEMA Director Witt emphasizes that the shear magnitude of the earthquake 
damage required all federal agencies to “really come together and foster a partnership,”  
noting that numerous emergency managers, the secretary of transportation, 
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into the evening, every evening, to “make sure that effort was united…That has made a 
big difference in how we respond, by doing it together and maximizing that Federal 
dollar to its limit in disasters.”128 
Finally, in a report compiled for the Department of Transportation, major 
participant and disaster responders were lauded:  “Everyone involved was driven by the 
desire to ‘be part of the recovery effort,’ and ‘take pride in showing what we could 
do.’”129 
Rebuilding the Los Angeles regional freeway network required a sustained 
effort by Caltrans and unprecedented cooperation between local, state, and 
federal government agencies.  Through demolition, construction bidding, 
and reconstruction, the agencies involved exercised innovative solutions to 
existing ‘red tape’ problems to restore the highway network.130 
D. INNOVATION 
Director Witt points to many streamlined innovations that greatly assisted in the 
recovery efforts, which include fast track housing using the state’s modeling system 
combined with area zip codes to speed the process of distributing money to those in need.  
Additionally, FEMA partnered with the Inspector General’s office to publicize the fact 
this streamlined process was always under audit and fraud would not be tolerated.  
Implementation of a new computer system called the Ace Computer Compact facilitated 
quick and reasonably accurate damage estimates after inspectors were out on site.  The 
implementation of a first of its kind computer system “cut time considerably in getting 
checks back to individuals.”131  The State Office of Emergency Services and FEMS 
established a recovery channel that for the first time linked over 100 different cable 
television stations to provide one information channel for vital disaster recovery 
information.  Finally, FEMA signed a memorandum of agreement with the state 
regarding mitigation, giving the state more authority to approve disaster mitigation 
projects.132 
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E. BUREAUCRACY 
“Anytime you have federal, state and local dollars placed into a disaster you will 
always have politics,” says Witt.133  He has argued on numerous occasions that even 
when a disaster has been declared by the President, federal responders must understand 
that the state and local government should lead response and recovery efforts; federal 
responders are in place as support.  Because of this pre-determined supportive role, it is 
extremely important that the federal government do a better job in educating mayors and 
Governors regarding the role of FEMA and other federal responders prior to a disaster.134 
While many things went right, there were some lessons to learn.  One was the 
comfort factor:  FEMA employees rely on past experiences to provide templates for a 
current crisis.  Witt says,  “FEMA has a lot of staff who work very hard, are very 
dedicated, and want to make a difference, but what has happened over the years is that 
they have been involved in so many disasters, they basically take those disasters and say 
well, this is the way we did it last time.”  Relying on the past in decision making gave 
inconsistent end results based upon locality rather than universal policy, which led 
FEMA to develop a policy book for federal coordination officers dealing with state and 
local authorities.135 
Questioned by a member of the Senate Subcommittee on Government 
Management, Information, and Technology about impediments to effective FEMA 
disaster response and recovery, Witt stated, “I think probably [the number one 
impediment] was more the bureaucratic system that we have than anything and trying to 
cut through that bureaucracy when trying to support state and local needs.”136 
Richard Andrews, Director of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services for 
the State of California, believes there should not be a nationalized or “Federal 911” 
operation for disaster response and recovery.  Supporting mandates for federal support to 
state or local authorities, he argues, 
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The role of the federal government during an emergency is to provide 
support to specific resource requests…it is important that federal 
emergency response efforts not be undertaken solely to showcase a 
presence for the media when no critical resource needs are present and 
requests from states have not been made.137 
Regarding the need for expedited contract requirement identification and award 
and the impediments presented during a disaster, Congressman Davis argues rules are in 
place and have a purpose, especially regarding the provision and awarding of contracts.  
However, he asserts that Congress spends much of its time to ensure legal contracts are 
negotiated, but “may prevent doing anything else in a timely manner…in mega-
emergencies I think you have got to have adequate waiver provisions…it is not FEMA’s 
fault [regarding timeliness of contract provisions] maybe it is our [Congress’s] fault.”138  
Here, the Congressmen is not taking the blame for bureaucratic requirements, rather 
identifying additional items which contributed to slowing the overall process of recovery 
regarding FEMA and the federal government’s requirements.  
A common misconception of state and local authorities and the general public is 
that the declaration of a disaster will “call in the cavalry” to provide any and all responses 
needed, and federal responders will make the affected area whole again.  State and local 
responders should understand that FEMA and other federal agencies play a support role, 
allowing local response plans to run their course.139  
E. MILITARY SUPPORT 
With numerous structures damaged by the earthquake, state and local responders 
saw the immediate need for temporary shelters for individuals.  Shelters were initially 
opened in large undamaged facilities like gymnasiums, but because such shelters were 
vulnerable to crime, as happened in Florida after hurricane Andrew, the city requested 
                                                 
137 Richard Andrews. Director, Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, State of California. “The 
Government’s Response to the Northridge Earthquake.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Government 
Management, Information and Technology: Committee on Government Reform and Oversight House of 
Representatives. 19 January 1996. 64. 
138 Tom Davis. “The Government’s Response to the Northridge Earthquake.” Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology: Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight House of Representatives. 19 January 1996. 10. 
139 Witt. 29. 
43
that the California National Guard provide round the clock security assistance.140  Over 
2,300 Guard members were mobilized to protect public safety and set up tents for 
emergency shelters. The Red Cross and Salvation Army shelters were not at capacity, but 
many people, fearing aftershocks, did not feel those shelters were safe.141 
F. CHALLENGES   
At times government officials practice response and recovery actions in real time 
or table top exercises. Unrecognized interdependencies are easily overlooked during 
disaster response exercises but can come to light in actual disaster response and recovery 
efforts.  For example, six hospitals generally considered safe havens for disaster response 
were crippled in the Northridge earthquake and required evacuation, which required 
using the limited number of ambulances and medical helicopters and greatly reduced the 
availability of emergency vehicles for other needs.142 
G. COMMUNICATIONS 
Immediately following the quake, communication was difficult.  Power was out 
because transmission lines were down or there were fires at electrical stations.  The 
power outage affected the central phone system and switching stations.  The 
telecommunications system itself became overwhelmed, as phones were off the hook: 
some because they were knocked off by the quake; others were in use by those trying to 
call family and friends.  There is a failsafe to turn off the telecommunications system 
when a certain percentage of phones are off the hook.143  The failsafe required 
emergency responders to rely on solely cellular phones and radios until the system could 
be brought back on line. 
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A major challenge during any disaster response and recovery is collaborative 
communications.  In  testimony to Congress, Major General Brandt emphasizes that 
communications were difficult at best:  “A challenge that we faced at the unit level in 
responding to the disaster was the lack of tactical communications interoperability with 
local law enforcement and fire response agencies…military communications is not 
compatible with civilian radios.”144 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the events resulting from 
the Northridge earthquake.  Unlike the Los Angeles Riots, a general tone of cooperation 
and success by responders was prevalent throughout the case study.  Information 
provided by first hand responders is presented to outline some impediments as well as 
innovative solutions to these impediments.  The following is a summary of items 
presented in this chapter.  Cooperation between local, state and federal responders proved 
a significant factor in the expediency of disaster response and recovery.  Next, this 
cooperation fostered innovation and allowed individuals to cut corners while focusing on 
disaster recovery.  However, the total response efforts to the earth quake stricken area 
was not flawless.  Bureaucratic problems were encountered regarding local state, and 
federal authorities.  The incorrect general application of past experiences of FEMA 
leaders to the current situation led to inconsistencies in resulting outcome.  Also, while 
innovation streamlined many response efforts, bureaucratic regulations slowed response 
efforts.  Finally, communications immediately following the earthquake were difficult to 
maintain at best.  Improvements are required here.  The following chapter will present 
information and a review of the disaster response and recovery resulting from Hurricane 
Katrina. 
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IV. HURRICANE KATRINA 
A. HISTORY  
Hurricane Katrina, upon reaching land in the Gulf of Mexico on 29 August 2005, 
had winds of 130-150 mph winds and produced an enormous amount of rain.  The energy 
of the hurricane created a storm surge as high as 27 feet along the northern Gulf coast.  
The high winds, storm surge and rain severely impacted 93,000 square miles of the Gulf 
coast region, which is nearly the size of Great Britain.145 The following figure provides a 
timeline of the development of Hurricane Katrina. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Hurricane Katrina Developmental Timeline146 
 
 
In preparation for landfall, over 1.3 million people evacuated the Gulf coast 
region.  Of those who stayed or were left behind, 62,000 were rescued by water craft 
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from roofs or attics; and 78,000 were evacuated by response vehicles like buses or 
aircraft.  About 12,000 hospital patients were evacuated, with another 42,000 individuals 
triaged at two hastily established emergency centers. The disaster recovery effort required 
the first-ever use of the National Disaster Medical System.147  Shelters of last resort were 
established by the Mayor of New Orleans and 25,000 individuals were using them within 
24 hours.  By September 1, over 60,000 individuals were at the Superdome awaiting 
evacuation.  While the Superdome served its purpose as a shelter of last resort, 
individuals housed in the dome were subject to difficult living conditions.  With sections 
of the roof peeled off and leaking water, and lacking significant amounts of potable water 
and food, and with sanitary conditions degrading by the hour, individuals were waiting 
for rescue.  As the flood waters were rising, individuals within the Superdome were 
hoping for a speedy evacuation.  Finally, late on 4 September, the last of individuals 
residing in the Superdome were evacuated. 
Hurricane Katrina wiped out infrastructure in much of the Gulf coast area: water, 
electricity, telephones, sewage, roads, bridges, phone and radio towers were all destroyed 
or inoperable.  The devastation was responsible for over 1,300 deaths, with Louisiana the 
hardest hit and over 1,000 deaths.  Well over 700,000 individuals were displaced from 
the region, and 300,000-plus homes were severely damaged or destroyed.148  Though the 
figures are still increasing, damage estimates were over $100 billion. 
Active duty military responded to the disaster as part of Joint Task Force-Katrina 
commanded by Lieutenant General Honore.  By September 1, there were over 3,000 
active duty personnel in place; four days later, that number was 14,232.149  The military 
participated in two primary ways to the response efforts following Katrina. The first was 
providing individuals to the Joint Field Office supporting federal operations as outlined  
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within the National Response Plan. The second, and where the bulk of the federal 
military was employed, was in service outside of the primary boundaries of the NRP, as 
part of Joint Task Force Katrina.150   
National Guardsmen deployed from all over the nation to the Gulf coast region.151  
Federal military also deployed to the region.  The following table provides a detailed 
listing of troop levels by date responding to Hurricane Katrina.  It identifies the total 
numbers of guardsmen and U.S. military troops deploying to the region, provides a time 
reference when individuals began to mobilize, and shows the duration individuals 
remained in the disaster stricken area. 
 
Figure 6.   Katrina Military Response Personnel Numbers by Day152 
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B. RESPONSIBILITIES 
Without pre-positioned supplies and equipment, local and state officials can only 
hope to acquire assets needed for response.  Congressmen Bill Schuster of Pennsylvania, 
in testimony to Congress stated, “One of important lessons of Katrina is that the federal 
government’s ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster is often dependent upon the 
quality of the state and local disaster system.”153  The state of Louisiana did not have any 
assets pre-positioned prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina.154  The lack of pre-
positioned equipment and assets contributed to the logistical problems encountered by 
both FEMA and the military as it took several days to establish properly functioning 
distribution hubs. 
Active duty military personnel responded and deployed to the disaster recovery 
area expeditiously.  Once established and on scene, Joint Task Force-Katrina supported 
the Louisiana National Guard and New Orleans Police Department with crowd control 
during the Superdome evacuation, maintenance of law and order in the streets and with 
door-to-door secondary searches for survivors and bodies. They provided assistance to 
many people who had not evacuated and yet were to be rescued.155  Along with other 
duties, at FEMA's request the DoD took control of FEMA’s logistical distribution 
operations. 
Often individuals from all over the nation want to help with money, supplies or 
personal effort in a disaster area.  Volunteers, despite good intentions, often are not self 
sufficient and sustaining them poses a problem. One local first responder said, of out of 
state volunteer responders, “They have this angelic look on their face and want to be of 
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help, but the first thing they ask is ‘where can we eat, sleep…'”156  Volunteer responders 
arriving with supplies have the ability to inundate logistical mangers with supplemental 
supplies reducing time these managers have to focus on tasks at hand: supplying essential 
materials in support of first responders’ needs in the disaster stricken area.  The presence 
of converging volunteers was one of many issues contributing to logistical problems 
encountered during the Katrina response by FEMA. 
The response efforts were hampered by confusion about the appropriate use of 
volunteer physicians from around the country. Doctors certified by various state boards 
arrived to provide medical support but those who were not licensed within the state where 
they were volunteering often were not allowed to practice.  Joe Ward, a Mississippi 
family physician, said there was confusion about whether outside doctors could practice 
in the state of Mississippi, and due to inconsistencies with malpractice insurance, doctors 
were often relegated to changing linens and dressings.  They were not allowed to provide 
prescriptions, administer medications or even suture wounds.157  Better organization 
between local, state, and federal responders would allow volunteer out-of-state doctors to 
practice in emergencies.  If such arrangements prove impossible, at least doctors should 
be discouraged from volunteering if they can provide no specialized services and simply 
burden already-stressed areas. 
C. DELAYED RESPONSE 
While DoD officials testified DoD was "leaning forward" taking quick 
action prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA officials said the DoD process 
appeared cumbersome, and Louisiana Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff 
said the DoD was, in his opinion, slow and overly bureaucratic.158   
Department of Defense officials claimed it was difficult to respond to inadequate 
requests such as “Send us everything you’ve got.”  Lacking an official request with an 
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itemized list of requirements, the DoD initiated an internal assessment of assets that 
might be required for disaster recovery.  It is not clear exactly when DHS or FEMA 
requested assistance from the DoD, nor what was requested.  Regardless, DoD plans and 
assets were in motion before Presidential declarations were made.159  Deployment of 
assets and personnel was delayed for various reasons. Assets required for response had to 
be kept out of harm’s way—in other words, far enough away to prevent their own 
destruction—and transport was extremely difficult due to flooding and debris. 
Analysis of the perceived delay in response reveals contradictory information.  
For example, a request from FEMA for the DoD to respond to a particular disaster 
involves several checks and balances, which ultimately require that the Secretary of 
Defense or a designated representative approve the request prior to the allocation of 
military assets.  Critics of this process claim the 21-step approval procedure takes too 
much time and delays the allocation of military resources in a disaster recovery and 
response.160  On the other hand, the military was fairly proactive in preparing to respond 
to Katrina’s aftermath.  Northern Command issued an execute order on August 26 which 
put DoD relief actions underway. The following day, NORTHCOM received its first 
request for support from FEMA which was to establish Barksdale Air Force Base as a 
logistical hub.161 
The military response was not the only effort to be criticized as slow after 
Katrina.  The American Red Cross, which provides initial food, shelter, medical care, and 
other essentials immediately following disasters, was also criticized.  Some said the Red 
Cross response was late and it pulled out of the area too early but critics did not 
understand the Red Cross response was only temporary, and it is the responsibility of 
local, state and federal government officials to press forward with long-term 
reconstruction needs.162  Additionally, counters to the critics of the Red Cross point to 
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the fact there are critical gaps in the Department of Homeland Security’s plans for 
responding to large-scale disasters, which include other governmental agencies such as 
the military.  
D. TRAINING AND EXERCISES 
During the initial response efforts to Katrina, there was virtually no unified 
command structure between state and federal governments.  This can be attributed to a 
number of factors including the sheer magnitude of the response required.  However, the 
lack of unity of command was also a failure to understand and implement of the National 
Response Plan’s Incident Command System (ICS).  Louisiana state officials had to hire a 
consultant specializing in the ICS and NRP three days after Katrina made landfall.163  
During times of crisis, management of numerous organizations and agencies is difficult at 
best; if individuals leading response efforts do not have proper training or understanding 
of response plans or command structures, coordination becomes even more chaotic.  A 
question here must be asked: were the consultants hired by Louisiana state officials 
needed to provide initial training to state officials because of a lack of preparedness, or 
was the NRP and ICS so complex that regardless of the number of hours of training, an 
external expert was required to train state officials? 
Largely due to the sheer magnitude of the devastation, there was a significant 
amount of tension within the leadership of all responding agencies.  One report points to 
the fact there had been little or no active participation by the DoD, state governors, or 
other state officials in planning for or conducting an exercise to a response to different 
hazards and disasters.  The report states that had there been continued participation in 
planning or exercises, the tensions of responding to an actual disaster would have been 
reduced.  However, because there were many simulations instead of actual 
intergovernmental exercises, leadership roles and coordination was hectic and extremely 
stressed when the real crisis struck.  “There were too many ‘civilian authorities’ in DoD’s 
military assistance to civilian authority planning,” referring to the  
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simulation of interaction with governors and other state officials and the fact individuals 
did not have the time nor concern to provide more realistic scenarios or leadership 
planning efforts.164   
Katrina tested the National Response Plan beyond its limits.  A critical item not 
identified in the NRP was a disaster that encompassed more than one state.  There was no 
specific mention of a multiple-state disaster response and recovery effort.  Because the 
Hurricane impacted three states, President Bush was required by provisions within the 
Stafford Act to declare each state a disaster and appoint a separate federal coordinating 
officer.165  Each individual responded to similar situations differently.  As a result there 
was no continuity of effort regarding federal support to the different state’s needs. 
Training, planning for, and testing response actions prior to an actual emergency 
is critical, and realistic exercises are important for evaluating the recovery response plans.  
On a number of occasions, individual Gulf coast first responders practiced response 
actions necessary for a successful disaster recovery within their own small areas of 
responsibility.  However, the practice sessions did not provide the realistic obstructions 
encountered in Hurricane Katrina, a critical shortfall in the actual response efforts for 
Katrina.  For example, responders within the area had no vehicles as they were all 
destroyed by the storm and most modes of transportation were useless because the streets 
were covered with debris.166  
Additional training and exercises might have helped the state headquarters of the 
Louisiana National Guard understand the importance of topography compared to 
location.  The headquarters was located in the historic Jackson Barracks on the edge of 
the lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans.  Because of its central location, it convenient for 
command exercises.  However, the exercises failed to consider that the entire area would  
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flood if the levees failed. The lack of pre-planning and realistic exercises meant that in 
the middle of the disaster recovery efforts, Guard members literally had to save 
themselves and relocate their headquarters.167 
E. POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY   
Leaders at all levels claim that accurate, timely, and continual communications 
are crucial for effective planning, coordination and response.  Communications were 
blamed for numerous inadequacies of Katrina responders. One report points to an 
underlying perception that some (but not all) communications problems were directly 
related to management and organizational issues rather than hardware problems at a 
particular location.168  Further to the point, internal communications within a responding 
organization had a greater effect on the ineffectiveness of a response than inoperative 
communications systems. 
There is a distinction between the military concept of a unified command and the 
civilian concept of authority.  A unified command in the military sense has well 
established command structure with the commander and all subordinates aligned with 
common goals and objectives.  Anyone stepping outside of these goals is typically 
subject to censure.  However, in domestic disasters recovery response efforts are led by 
elected officials who have constituencies to which they must answer and may not align 
with previously established objectives in an overarching emergency action plan.  Elected 
officials, as public servants, are subject to the public opinion of their constituents.169 
There are many checks, balances, and approval validation points when states and 
FEMA request assistance from the DoD.  The process is supposed to ensure that DoD 
assets are not allocated incorrectly or unlawfully, and the process gives the states and 
FEMA maximum opportunity for coordination with the DoD.  Louisiana officials called 
the process of approval by the DoD "bureaucratic." Despite the multiple layers of 
coordination, validation, and approval paperwork, a Congressional Bipartisan Select 
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Committee could not determine the origin of the request to provide forces to 
Louisiana.170  Officials from Louisiana disputed that their Adjutant General had made the 
request directly to the commander of the Joint Task Force-Katrina and not to FEMA, the 
proper and official procedure for requesting assistance.171  Regardless, processes seem at 
a minimum too bureaucratic.  
When reviewing the response to the aftermath of Katrina by the federal 
government, elected officials often accuse FEMA of lack of preparation, foresight, and 
planning.  However, states and local communities who have a limited amount of 
emergency response capability should share in the blame.  Local communities, counties 
and states often do not stage adequate essential response items such as water, food and 
generators to remain self sufficient for the first few days following a disaster.172  Though 
much of flood stricken New Orleans was under water, many surrounding communities 
were also not prepared for self sufficiency in the immediate wake of the disaster.  
Because of this the federal government had to assume the role of the first responder, a 
role not prescribed by planning efforts.  Though FEMA has much room for improvement 
regarding the Katrina response, local and state officials did not help the situation by not 
preparing as best they could.   
It is important to understand the difference between foresight and intelligence 
when compared to planning.  Leaders may have intelligence estimates on the potential for 
catastrophic events, yet if plans and preparations are not made, the chance of successful 
recovery decreases significantly.  The Democratic staff report to the House Committee on 
Science claims that the ineffective response and recovery after Katrina was “due neither 
to a failure of foresight nor to a failure of intelligence…scientists had projected for some 
time that a major hurricane would probably flood New Orleans.”173   
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In times of need, individuals may fall victim to the “me first” scenario, 
exemplified by local officials trying to hijack or divert shipments of critical assets.  Local 
officials, sometimes brandishing firearms, tried to intimidate truck drivers transporting 
response items such as generators.174  On numerous occasions, FEMA trailers full of 
critical response items were stopped at roadblocks placed by local officials.  At the 
roadblocks, the trailers were inspected and often diverted by officials to destinations 
other than their original intended location.175  Additionally, generators already installed 
were moved to other locations at the discretion of local officials.  Though local officials 
may or may not have better understood where assets were needed, this understanding 
may have been better served by communicating these requirements to first responders to 
ensure other areas expecting supplies do not remain unattended.   
Both the Mayor of New Orleans and the Governor of Louisiana were quick to 
blame the federal government for an inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina.  Initial 
after action reports contained sharp criticism of both the Mayor and the Governor, 
claiming that their own actions and failures to act were major factors in the numerous 
Katrina response and recovery problems.  Disaster plans were outdated, incomplete, or 
nonexistent; there were numerous delays in issuing evacuation orders; there was a lack of 
planning and execution to evacuate those who could not evacuate themselves; and finally, 
there were significant delays in official requests for federal assistance.176  
Individuals at all levels of response perceived those at different levels as 
problematic to the overall success of recovery efforts.  For example, local responders felt 
that within their community, response efforts and coordination were going very well.  
Beyond the local level, they felt coordination among state and federal officials was 
lacking.  At the state level, a similar perception was prevalent. State officials felt 
everything was flowing smoothly but there was hardly anything happening with mission  
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coordination and accomplishment among local or federal officials.  Federal responders 
completed the perception loop by claiming that things were going well at their level of 
organization while state and local officials were not doing what was needed.177   
F. ASKING FOR HELP 
During the Hurricane Katrina response, there were a number of confusing 
requests for federal assistance, in particular requests for military assistance.  As early as 
August 30, the DoD encountered confusion about FEMA’s requests for assistance and 
was unclear what was official and what was only a matter of dialogue.178  That day, DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff requested an update from the DoD on the status of shelters, 
levees, and other essential response items in place or underway by the DoD.  The Office 
of the Secretary of Defense could not understand why Chertoff was requesting such 
information, as the DoD was not conducting such missions because they had not yet been 
requested by FEMA.179 
In parallel with the NRP, the DoD Joint Doctrine on Homeland Security plans for 
DoD support to civil authorities when local, state and other federal agencies are 
overwhelmed and assistance is requested by the lead federal agency in the response.  In 
other words: “DoD’s approach to civil support: it is generally a resource of last resort.”180  
Though this may be the DoD’s stance, critics argue that because DoD is basically a 
supporting agency and often a last resort, the sentiment may foster a reactive instead of a 
proactive approach to disaster recovery.181  Analysts suggest that DoD must be proactive 
in disasters that overwhelm local and state officials because “the question then arises, 
whether the agencies and authorities that have been overwhelmed are indeed capable of 
making the incident assessments and informed resource requests necessary to obtain DoD 
assistance.”182 
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Though the DoD may consider itself a last resort disaster responder, the 
perception by the general public is that DoD should not only respond but it should be the 
first on any scene with supplies necessary to prevent further suffering or property 
damage.  The National Response Plan includes provisions for a proactive federal 
response to catastrophic events which seem likely to overwhelm the resources of other 
responders.  In this case, DoD may respond to requests from civil authorities prior to 
official authorization if immediate actions will “save lives, prevent human suffering, or 
mitigate great property damage.”183  However, unless civilian authorities ask for help, the 
DoD can not respond unless the President or the Secretary of Homeland Security makes 
the necessary declarations.  Chertoff declared Katrina an Incident of National 
Significance on August 30, a bit late for a proactive DoD response.184 
State and federal integration is difficult, especially with a disaster of Katrina's 
magnitude.  Even agencies within the federal government had problems with 
coordination.  Early in the response effort, the DoD contended that FEMA had never 
officially requested support from the military.  FEMA argues that without a formal paper 
trail, the DoD was able to selectively pick and chose which requests by FEMA to 
support, and those deemed inappropriate by the DoD were essentially considered as not 
requested by FEMA.185 
G. COMMUNICATIONS 
During response operations, ineffective communications between FEMA and 
other federal agencies, including the military, prevented the proper use of many federal 
assets.  The communications failure was attributed to staff lacking familiarity with 
communications equipment and the procedures of other federal responders.186 
Hurricane Katrina all but devastated communications in the Gulf coast area.  
Though the national response plan has provisions for lost communications within a 
disaster area, it did not fully state which agency should establish initial communications.  
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An assessment of communications reveals that while the military and DHS had 
communications equipment ready to deploy, they did not deploy it because there was 
never a request from local and state officials.187  One can only imagine how officials on 
the ground within a disaster area, where phone lines and communications towers have 
been destroyed, can pass along requests for support from federal agencies.  On one hand 
federal agencies wait for requests from local and state officials to ensure they are not 
overstepping their bounds, and on the other hand, local and state officials cannot request 
support because they do not have the equipment to do so. 
Interoperability of communications equipment seems the latest phrase to describe 
disaster recovery and response equipment needs.  The problem was known well before 
Hurricane Katrina, but exemplified further when National Guard and U.S. military units 
could not communicate with civilian agencies because their radios and equipment are 
incompatible.188 
An aspect of communications often overlooked is the ability to gather 
intelligence.  The DoD can use satellites for images of particular locations of interest.  
After Katrina, there was little or no use of satellite imagery to pinpoint areas requiring the 
most relief.  Along with this underused intelligence potential, information gained in 
damage assessment aerial flights was not properly and expeditiously disseminated.  As a 
result, DoD relied on news reports of affected areas in the immediate days following the 
hurricane.189  This reliance on news reports was cited as evidence that the military was 
more reactive than proactive in the response efforts.190 
H. ASSESSMENTS OF THE MILITARY  
During the Katrina disaster recovery and response, all responders understood that 
unity of effort was important.  However, the fact there were several different 
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commanders in the field severely hampered this unity of effort.  Indeed, the commander 
of the active duty forces often did not know what forces or equipment the Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Alabama National Guard commanders had available.191  The lack of 
unity hampered the efficiency of response efforts. 
Secondary to unity of effort is intelligence gathering and the ability to obtain 
situational awareness of the disaster area.  The inability of the military to expeditiously 
organize necessary assets and personnel into an effective response package to localized 
requirements resulted from lack of timely damage assessments, force integration issues 
involving the Guard and active duty military, communications problems, logistics 
responsibilities handed off by FEMA, and numerous search and rescue efforts that were 
not coordinated between the responding agencies, including the National Guard units.192 
The National Guard faced numerous internal challenges, especially lack of 
equipment like medical gear, radios, vehicles, heavy equipment and aircraft.  Prior to 
Guard deployment overseas in the War on Terror, units were equipped to approximately 
76 percent of requirements.  Units just prior to Katrina were equipped to approximately 
35 percent, a result of leaving equipment overseas to ensure that follow on units had 
proper equipment and to reduce the cost of moving the same equipment with each unit 
rotation.193   
On one hand, there is contention that the military was slow to respond, and when 
there was a response, often the wrong personnel, equipment, or supplies arrived on scene.  
An important factor for a successful response is proper, timely damage assessment; initial 
responses are based on information passed along by those on the ground within the 
disaster area.  The National Response Plan says that local and state officials are 
responsible for damage assessment during a disaster.194  On the other hand, the plan also 
points out potential for local and state officials to become overwhelmed.  As was the case 
with Katrina, overwhelmed local and state officials were calling for any and all help they 
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 could muster.  Others note that the military’s response was quick but until they were able 
to place their own individuals within the disaster area, response provisions had to be 
based upon local and state coordinator’s input.   
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided recommendations to the 
Secretary of Defense outlining numerous challenges and shortfalls the military 
encountered in the response to Katrina which resulted from the need for better plans that 
incorporate lessons learned from previous disaster recovery efforts and more challenging 
exercises.195 
Prior to and during Katrina’s landfall, it was asserted the National Guard did not 
have a clear understanding of the DoD planning guidance developed at Northern 
Command, including operational plans for military support to civilian authorities.  
Adding to the confusion, the National Guard Bureau claimed there was a lack of clearly 
defined lines of command, control and communication which resulted in inefficiencies in 
effort.  Two points to illustrate: On numerous occasions the 82nd Airborne Division was 
deployed to sectors already under patrol by the National Guard. And Marine amphibious 
units arrived in Mississippi without pre-coordinated transportation; as a result, Guard 
units were required to set aside current operations to transport the Marines to 
Louisiana.196 
On the other hand, it has been touted that the leadership of JTF-Katrina, LTG 
Honore and his staff, with advance planning and the equipment and manpower of the 
military, were especially responsible for the success of domestic security, logistical 
support, and search and rescue.197   
The military has an inherent understanding of the need for flexibility in 
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designated locations for essential survival supplies were cut off from the supply end of 
the logistics hub and the individuals needing the aid.  The military immediately offered 
airlift helicopters to assist in distributing the aid.198 
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the media was filled with 
images of victims and often exaggerated instances of looting and general civil unrest; 
even the media was calling for a military response because the emphasis on lawlessness 
was compared to “urban warfare,” and the military is seen as equipped to manage such 
situations.199  Analysts argue that the fact the government failed to adequately respond to 
the aftermath of Katrina almost requires the military to prepare for all types of disaster 
response activities.  Because of the large amount of looting in the aftermath of the 
hurricane, analysis leads military proponents to conclude that the management and 
response of disasters should not be managed by civil authorities, by rather by those who 
can respond, and respond with force when required to suppress civil unrest.200  On the 
other hand, individuals may conclude civil authorities should be able to manage the same 
civil unrest situation. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the events resulting from 
Hurricane Katrina.  The following is a summary of items presented in this chapter.  
Difficulty arose immediately following the disaster because leaders at all levels did not 
understand specific responsibilities.  Additionally, this lack of understanding contributed 
to a delayed response because of incorrect assumptions and poor requests for assistance.  
Similar to the Los Angeles Riots, inadequate training and exercises at multiple levels 
contributed to a lack of unified command, duplication of effort, or no response at all.  
Disasters of this magnitude perpetuate political and bureaucratic difficulties.  Finger 
pointing, strained communications with many checks and balances, and inadequate 
communication of requirements played significant roles in delaying the response.  Poor 
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pre-planning and lack of pre-positioned assets coupled with the inability to request 
assistance added to the delayed response efforts.  Finally, a lack of contiguous 





V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Previous chapters highlighted problems associated with the responses to three 
disasters, each of which required a distinct response and recovery approach.  Despite 
many differences among the cases, there are also trends and similarities that can provide 
recommendations for future improvement to assist in the reduction of political and 
bureaucratic impediments to responders.  Focusing on civilian-military relations and the 
interaction between local, state, and federal responders, the following summaries and 
recommendations are provided to assist in the improvement of disaster response. 
A. POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP 
Politics play a large role in disaster response and recovery.  As previously noted, 
FEMA and the DoD are supposed to initially respond in a purely supportive role.  Their 
role is submissive to the hierarchy of state or local elected officials; these same officials 
directing disaster recovery efforts often desire re-election.  During disaster response it is 
imperative that turf wars do not exist.  Elected officials should break political barriers, 
eliminate finger pointing, stop thinking about elections, and join together to ensure that 
local communities receive the support necessary to reduce suffering and loss of life and 
property. 
Disasters of large magnitude usually require response efforts from multiple 
jurisdictions.  During these large disasters assign one individual point of contact to lead 
the recovery and establish unity of effort.  One single point of contact should assume the 
leadership role with other jurisdictions accepting a subordinate role to assure unity of 
effort.  Separate responses without unity of effort and command can severely degrade the 
recovery efforts of federal responders and result in duplication of effort. 
Opponents of state or local requests for help assert that the federal government 
should respond upon declaration of a disaster and under direction of the President or his 
delegated representative.  An immediate declaration by the President would sidestep 
delays in calling for federal help that occur when state and local officials wait to see if 
their own responders can handle the situation.  The question is what should trigger an 
automatic federal response?  Can the federal government establish criteria for every 
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disaster and determine in advance when the declaration should be made to send in 
military troops?  Furthermore, states receive federal funding to offset costs of 
preparedness.  If it is assumed that the federal government will respond, why continue to 
fund the states?  That money could be channeled to FEMA or the military to pre-position 
adequate response and recovery supplies throughout the United States. 
When local or state officials are overwhelmed, they should produce a properly 
tailored request for assistance. “Send us all you’ve got” does not give federal responders 
the information required to mobilize assets.  First responders on the ground provide 
essential information to logisticians and responders preparing to ship critical assets.  The 
request for help must declare immediate and short term requirements to hasten efforts 
outside the recovery zone and reduce confusion caused by the disaster and the flood of 
information and misinformation. 
The President has the authority to take control if a situation appears out of the 
control of state or local officials.  However, there are numerous reasons to allow state and 
local responders to remain as the lead officials.  They understand local problems and are 
assumed to be better equipped to respond.  If they become overwhelmed, a request for 
help makes them more likely to cooperate with federal responders.  Problems are likely to 
arise if the President acts prior to or without a request.201   
Requests for help from state or local officials must be immediate, without 
underlying political agendas, and not assume that the federal government will bail out 
unprepared communities.  An immediate request quickly establishes rules of engagement 
and declares who is in charge to ensure all responders work together, prevent duplication 
of effort and eliminate the problem of conflicting orders by different on-scene incident 
commanders.   
B. LOGISTICS 
A review of the cases shows the benefit of pre-positioning critical response assets.  
Though many disasters are difficult to predict, others have been foreseen.  Pre-
positioning response items can significantly reduce response times, loss of life and loss of 
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property.  Present policies should be reviewed and revised to provide incentives and 
possibly even funding to states for pre-positioning assets.  Pre-positioning should take 
place both within and around the potential disaster area so responders can more quickly 
transport essential items into the impact zone.202 
A careful balance must be maintained between positioning assets within the 
predicted disaster area versus around the potential disaster area.  As noted in the Katrina 
case study, many items positioned within the affected states were destroyed and it was 
difficult to transport those around the disaster area because of road damage and debris.  
The Katrina case shows that FEMA was not prepared to manage the logistics of 
receiving, inventorying, and distributing materials for Gulf coast disaster recovery.  Key 
logistical nodes should be identified early, before a predicted disaster, or as a standard 
policy in areas where disasters are a constant threat, as with the Northridge earthquake.  
These nodes should receive, inventory, and distribute essential items from outside the 
stricken area.  The early and publicly declared establishment of logistical zones reduces 
stress and eliminates the requirement that supply logistics be managed from within the 
stricken zone.  Additionally, using logistical hubs as a staging area supports the ideal of 
convergence.  With logistical hubs, first responders can focus on requirements at hand 
rather than the immense problem of logistics.  Hub managers can provide responders with 
an active inventory of items and distribute them as needed. 
To support logistical hubs and inventory management, the National Response 
Plan and other disaster response recovery plans should establish a working national 
inventory of critical assets, including items held by the U.S. military, National Guard, 
FEMA, and pre-positioned state and local items.  The items do not have to be placed on 
reserve or standby.  An active inventory of response assets would have identified the 
shortfalls, allowing identification of critical items that had been deployed.  Because it 
bears on military readiness, the status of critical assets in the military is often classified.  
The national inventory proposed here does not have to include all military items, but only 
those which might be called upon for disaster recovery.  A national inventory  
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incorporating items from the local level provides disaster response planners with a 
predetermined list of potential needs early on, and can even facilitate pre-deployment or 
pre-positioning of essential items. 
C. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
A review of the cases shows that officials at all levels need supplemental training 
and education.  They should receive proper training and education on emergency 
essential items that should be pre-positioned within their communities and on the 
intricacies of the National Response Plan. They need a thorough understanding of the 
NRP assumption that state and local responders will be self sufficient immediately 
following a disaster and should plan accordingly. Another area for education and 
training improvements is civilian and military officials' understanding of the Posse 
Comitatus Act.  In several cases, misinterpretation of the Act caused delayed or duplicate 
efforts or led to no response at all.  Military and civilian commanders must understand 
that the Act prohibits the U.S. military from enforcing domestic laws unless a 
Presidential declaration has been made.  Until a declaration is announced, the military 
may respond in a supportive manner to preserve life or property.  When federal military 
may be called upon for support or integration, inaccurate assessments and interpretations 
of the Posse Comitatus Act can impede timely and effective disaster response and 
recovery efforts. 
Supplemental consideration should be given to training requirements and 
integration of the military and National Guard with state and local officials.  Each branch 
of the military has a language of its own, and civilian organizations have their own 
idiosyncratic terminology. None of the parties involved should assume that common 
terminology will be understood clearly by others. 
Integrated, realistic exercises integrating state and local officials with federal 
responders can reveal shortfalls in response efforts. Multi-jurisdictional exercises that 
cross city, county and state boundaries require integration of many different agencies, 
including the National Guard and federal military.  Full-scale exercises are very costly 
and even smaller exercises with just leadership echelons can prove expensive, as they 
require considerable planning.  It is also imperative to understand that exercises disrupt 
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daily operations.  Responders at all levels must maintain a certain state of readiness 
within their own areas of responsibility, which costs money and time.  Time and money 
taken from readiness preparation for exercise planning or participation requires additional 
investments that are often not provided due to budgetary or time constraints.   
Many exercises are designed at the local level, do not integrate multiple 
jurisdictions, and do not integrate FEMA and other federal agencies.  These exercises are 
typically designed around one crisis, and do not take into account possible cascading 
effects of a large scale disaster.  The Katrina case reveals that exercises conducted by the 
Louisiana National Guard accounted for disaster relief in the local surrounding area but 
did not account for the requirement to relocate the command and control headquarters 
when the levees failed.  Local, state, and federal officials must integrate exercises and 
response factors using the National Response Plan as a guide.  While realistic exercises 
are costly, inadequate response in a disaster can prove even costlier.  Under the premise 
of the National Response Plan, local, state and federal officials should conduct at least 
one table top and one physical exercise, annually integrating responders at all levels.  
Funds for these exercises should be provided by the federal government, monitored for 
proper allocation, actual readiness and accountability.  To ensure accountability, exercise 
planners can provide an estimate of exercise expenditures, conduct the exercise, then, to 
receive reimbursement, be required to provide an after actions report that includes lessons 
learned, areas for improvement, and actions undertaken for improvement.  Responders 
would be able to practice, and the federal government would get annual updates on 
readiness status. 
D. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications is among the most important aspects of command and control in 
disaster response and recovery.  Responders at all levels should integrate in exercises to 
help identify shortfalls, including incompatible communications equipment.  It is 
unrealistic to rely on communications equipment in place prior to a disaster; this point 




establishes the National Incident Management System within the National Response Plan 
directing local, state, and federal responders to cooperate to integrate communications 
equipment.  Improvements have been made; however, more are needed.  
E. MISSION DECLARATION 
The U.S. military and National Guard have many different missions.  Several are 
very similar if not identical.  The U.S. military is responsible for the overall defense of 
the nation and the preservation of peace and security.  The National Guard has the same 
mission but is also heavily involved in helping communities during disasters and civil 
unrest.  When not federalized, Guardsmen are permitted and are often called upon to 
enforce domestic laws.  There is a paradox in the roles of the U.S. military and the 
National Guard: Typically the U.S. military deploys overseas to preserve the peace and 
secure U.S. interests abroad while the National Guard assumes a domestic role and 
remains on call to support state governors.  However, the National Guard has been 
deploying at a high rate overseas.   
This thesis reviewed disaster recovery situations with particular focus on political 
or bureaucratic impediments in civilian-military relations.  Three examples of large-scale 
disasters were reviewed to illustrate problems encountered by responders and present 
recommendations to reduce impediments.  Possible areas for additional research might 
include an analysis of the U.S. military stationed within the U.S. increasing its supportive 
role in disaster response and recovery.  A shift in traditional roles of the military may 
require the missions of the federal military and National Guard be revised.  If these 
missions are revised, should supplemental funding be provided to ensure mission 
readiness and fulfillment?   
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